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The focus of the thesis is on the control of the development cooperation appropriation 
maintained by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. At its foundation, development 
cooperation is the political pledge of the international community, the UN and the EU to 
eradicate poverty, hunger and similar scourges of humanity. The mandate of this pledge is 
relayed though a legal chain of command from the UN to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
its public servants for implementation. 
The total amount of Finnish development cooperation disbursements or the flow of official 
development assistance has amounted to approximately one billion euros in the last few years. 
Following the continuing recession of Finland’s economy, the proposed development 
cooperation budget for 2016 is about 700 million euros. The proposal was presented to 
Parliament despite the advent of the UN’s new Sustainable Development Goals replacing the 
old Millennium Development Goals. The appropriation in question encompasses a sizeable and 
complex asset to control in which risk is inherent. As the State is responsible and accountable 
to the public, it tries to control the aforementioned risk in order to improve the effectiveness 
and public impact of development cooperation funds. 
The method used is legal doctrine with traces of political and economic insights. The thesis 
explores what norms form the system of controlling Finnish public funds and especially 
development cooperation. The legal sources utilized range from international treaties and 
OECD standards to budgeting enactments of the State of Finland and internal regulations of 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Due to the very nature of the issue as a combined legal, 
political and economic problem, the paper will utilize arguments and empirical notions from 
the aforementioned fields in order to fill empty spaces of law and construct viable bridges 
between provisions. 
The key finding of the paper is the observation that national norms of control and budgeting 
form a fragmented and obscure network of multiple definitions and numerous criteria that do 
not seem to serve a uniform purpose. The concept of operational and financial planning entails 
the Ministry and development cooperation to induce public impact and upkeep effectiveness. 
At the same time, multiple external and internal control entities scan the flow of aid resources 
with different frameworks that are predominantly of private origin. All the while it is the wish 
of the Government that the control of development cooperation is harmonized and that 
performance guidance is sharpened.  As a cherry on top, the true normative status of these 
provisions and doctrines is disputed. 
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1 Introduction – Development Cooperation amidst Disarray 
1.1 Political Backdrop and Media Coverage 
Development cooperation is a noble endeavour, but it has had to weather harsh times in the 
current decade. The financial crisis of 2008 has taken its toll on public spending. The escalation 
of conflicts in the Middle East has created a surge of refugees and asylum seekers. This 
European migrant crisis of 2015 is the most recent topic under which the objective and 
usefulness of development cooperation is being questioned1. The Proposal for the Budget of 
Finland 2016 was unveiled by the Government on 27 September 2015 and the approval process 
is currently ongoing2. With ever growing media pressure and scrutiny, the Government 
proposed cutting down the development cooperation budget by about 200 million euros from 
the established appropriation of one billion euros3. 
Economist Dambisa Moyo published her book Dead Aid in the year 2009. In it, she 
aggressively criticizes development aid and claims that sending aid has locked the developing 
states into an environment where corruption, the distortion of markets and poverty grow instead 
of prosperity. At the same time, similar news articles started to appear in national media. The 
former Finnish ambassador to Mozambique and Kenya, Matti Kääriäinen, recently joined the 
opposition by publishing his own book titled Kehitysavun kirous4 in 2014. According to him, 
resources and capital flow to the elite of developing countries instead of to the development of 
democracy and governance. He states that development cooperation has not met its goals.5 
Development cooperation is being bashed from multiple fronts as ineffective waste. For 
example, recent headlines of Helsingin Sanomat6 tackled at the use of tax paradises in 
development aid through the secretive FINNFUND and the decision to funnel more aid funds 
to FINNFUND while decreasing other fund assets7. The subsequent FINNFUND decision to 
aid a controversial dam on the Mekong River in Laos also met resistance, since the project 
                                                 
1 Helsingin Sanomat 09 October 2015. 
2 Parliament’s Special Committees will release their statements on 5.11.2015 and the follow-up debate will be 
held on week 51, see Parliamentary Office 2 October 2015. 
3 Ministry of Finance [budjetti.vm.fi]: GP 30/2015 ps: BP for the year 2016, main division 24, chapter 30 p. 1. 
4 ‘The Curse of Development Aid’ in English. 
5 Helsingin Sanomat 21 January 2015. 
6 Helsinki Times in English. 
7 Helsingin Sanomat 11 July 2015; Helsingin Sanomat 24 August 2015. 
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owner is listed on EU’s tax paradise list and NGOs are reporting negative environmental 
effects8. 
In 2012, the investigative journalism program Yle9 MOT10 covered the so called Costa Rica-
Instrumentarium corruption case11, in which Finnish development cooperation funds were 
suspected of abuse. According to interviews of the program, the Finnish investigation was 
deemed as too slow and unresponsive.12 Indeed, Ministry for Foreign Affairs filed a crime 
report to the National Bureau of Investigation in 2005 after Yle revealed the suspected bribery. 
The Finnish trial was finally held in 2013. It was suspected that up to 8.7 million dollars were 
used to bribe Costa Rican officials. As a result of the investigation by the Costa Rican 
authorities, seven persons were imprisoned in Costa Rican jurisdiction in 2009 (including the 
former president of Costa Rica, Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier) while all the charges in 
Finnish jurisdiction were dropped. The case also sparked discussion in Parliament.13 Yet, 
despite all the negative news, 87 % of Finns say that development cooperation is very important 
or fairly important14. 
This dilemma fueled my interest in the subject at hand. I questioned why development 
cooperation is the attention of so much scrutiny in contrast to many other public budgetary 
issues. How is it audited and evaluated according to law? Are there legal deficits and problems 
in Finnish Law concerning development aid control? 
In the European Union (EU), development cooperation was incorporated into EU Law as far 
back as 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. From supporting former colonies, the EU has 
progressively evolved to more diverse foreign aid. The Treaty of Lisbon finally enforced this 
stature, when the eradication of poverty was named as one of the goals the Union. For example, 
in 2010 the EU signed the Cotonou Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries in order to expand on the aforementioned goal. In the same year, the EU conformed 
                                                 
8 FINNFUND is considered a financial institution and some of its documents are declared trade secrets. Helsingin 
Sanomat 07 September 2015. 
9 Yle (Yleisradio Oy) is a State owned media channel. 
10 MOT stands for ‘which is what had to be investigated’ (‘mikä oli tutkittava’ in Finnish). It is a word play on 
the Latin phrase quod erat demonstrandum (‘which is what had to be proven’) usually used at the end of a 
completion of a mathematical proof. 
11 See 2400/R/151/07. 
12 Yle MOT 2012. 
13 Yle MOT 2013; Written Question 853/2012 ps p. 1. 
14 Taloustutkimus Oy 2015 p. 5. 
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to aiding the United Nations (UN) in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by 
2015.15 
On 25 September 2015, the new Sustainable Developments Goals (SDG) were unanimously 
adopted at the UN Sustainable Development 2015 Summit16 as a part of the so called Post-
2015 process. The SDGs superseded the MDGs, as the deadline of the MDGs was the year 
2015. Consequently, most of the SDGs are set out to be completed by 2030. Even before the 
SDGs were finalized at the Summit, they were causing changes in the global development 
cooperation scene17. 
Among UN and EU, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
is also a major organization in the development assistance field18. Most of legitimate 
international development cooperation standards and guides are crafted by the OECD. 
Development aid covers a vast number of different instruments, transactions and cash flows. 
In Finland, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) is mostly responsible for the 
coordination of development cooperation in Finland. It can distribute aid to multiple targets in 
multiple ways. Targets include inter alia a country, a region, a non-governmental organization 
(NGO), EU, UN, a sector or an individual project. Aid can be humanitarian assistance, debt 
relief, direct transactions, machinery or a contract. Altogether the channels of development aid 
form a large group. 
“Risks are inherent in development cooperation19”. In addition to misuse, the funds may be 
used improperly or unprofitably. The objective of control is to stop misuse and ensure that 
development cooperation funds are used rationally, suitably, effectively and according to 
agreements. Control can range from audits to physical inspections and to notice obligations. In 
the MFA, actual internal control is maintained by the operational units, the Unit of Internal 
Audit and the Development Evaluation Unit. 
                                                 
15 European Union 2014 p. 3. 
16 UNGA Resolution 70/1. The Summit was preceded by three annual High Level Political Fora where the SDGs 
were prepared. 
17 OECD 2015 p. 3. OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría declared in the 07 September 2015 published 
foreword the following: “Only through joined up action guided by an effective system of global governance will 
we be able to make the Sustainable Development Goals a break-through success. And that is what this 
Development Co-operation Report 2015: Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action is all about.” 
18 The French name of OECD is ‘L'Organisation de cooperation et de développement économiques’. 
19 Government Report on the Impact and Coherence of Development Policy 2014 p. 38. Also see Department for 
Development Policy 2012 p. 6; Yle 2 April 2006. 
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This paper is extremely topical since the new Sustainable Development Goals were recently 
agreed upon and there is an ongoing discussion on the validity of development cooperation 
budgeting and control. The discussion has only heated up after the proposal to cut funding. 
Additionally, the legal dimension of development cooperation and especially its control has 
not seemingly been researched as much as other dimensions (e.g. economics and program 
effectiveness). 
1.2 Research Plan 
1.2.1 Field of Law 
The focus of this thesis are the norms of development cooperation and especially the norms of 
controlling development cooperation funding. First we need to explore in which field of law 
the subject operates in. As always, it is prudent to acknowledge that the categorization of legal 
disciplines does not yield any normative effects. Neither should we believe that fields of law 
mark any strict fields that law should operate in. Disciplines merely help us organize and 
navigate different aspects of law and maintain a reasonable view of the subject at hand. 
The legal research of statutes connected with development aid is not as comprehensive as many 
other legal science fields. From a national and ministry-level viewpoint it can be seen as form 
of public law and more specifically financial administrative law. It could merely be a series of 
administrative matters and decisions supplemented by institutive constitutional law and 
financial statutes. At a global scale, development cooperation forms a discipline of its own. 
Although development cooperation encompasses an infinite amount of actors, layers and 
instruments, Dann proposes that it can be treated as an independent discipline. Like this thesis, 
he delimits the scope of his systematization to public funding. Thus, he specifically states the 
law of development cooperation is actually the law of official development assistance (ODA) 
i.e. the flow of public funds from developed states to the Third World.20 
                                                 
20 Dann 2013 pp. 13–14. 
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The control aspect of development cooperation belongs primarily to the legal disciplines of 
commerce law and financial administrative law. Provisions connected with budgetary control 
have a distinct feature. They are more closely linked to ideas and concepts from other fields of 
science like auditing and evaluation. Some of the core functions of certain principles (e.g. 
sound financial management, true and fair view, and effectiveness) are more easily ascertained 
with outside help from other fields than legal science. According to Myllymäki, research of the 
public economy carries in itself traits of three different scientific branches: Politics, economics 
and law. He states that “the knowledge of politics and economics belong to the virtues of every 
researcher of public finance law”.21  
The topic also has some contact surface with human rights obligations since development 
cooperation is usually funded in order to eradicate poverty, improve health services, ensure 
access to water, and similar fundamental goals. Nonetheless, this thesis treads without a doubt 
mostly in the field of financial administrative law. The control of ODA in the Finnish 
jurisdiction is a composition of administrative decisions and financial duties that are subject to 
international law and standards. 
The paper will expect that the reader has a sufficient level of prior knowledge concerning public 
law, control and Finnish state budgeting. The substance of the matter at hand will be attacked 
straightforwardly and without delay by bypassing introduction phases. For example, some of 
the pieces of the puzzle (e.g. the fundamentals of auditing) will not be dealt with in-depth to 
conserve resources for the attainment of the true objective. 
1.2.2 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to organize and describe the legal framework of development 
cooperation management and especially the control of cooperation cash flows in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Finland sector. Development cooperation funding and its control are built 
upon numerous different legal components, like definitions, prerequisites, processes, principles 
and decisions. The objective of the thesis is to systematize and interpret the norms that are used 
                                                 
21 Myllymäki 2007 p. 12. 
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to construct the aforementioned framework and components. In other words, this thesis will 
formalize the Finnish control component of the law of development cooperation. 
Development aid law itself can be divided into different components e.g. the obligation to 
distribute aid, the definition of official development assistance (ODA) and appropriation limits. 
Control spans a large subject in itself as well. It can consist of e.g. pre-emptive mechanisms 
(ex ante), constant monitoring or after-action evaluation (ex post). Modes of control include 
inter alia audits, evaluations, risk assessment and risk response. This paper will explore the 
legal web connecting the two aforementioned legal norm dimensions (development 
cooperation and control) and combine them into a coherent legal model. 
The budget, development cooperation and control are also subject to general principles of 
resource management as issued by parliamentary laws (e.g. the State Budget Act 423/1988). 
Control always measures the target against suitable bench marks and standards. When viewed 
state-wise, these bench marks and standards are inter alia the principles of effectiveness, 
impact and transparency. If we are to understand control, we must understand how its meters 
and gauges work. Concordantly, the research question of this thesis can be formulated into the 
following form: 
What are the relevant legal norms concerning the control of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland’s development cooperation appropriations at the state and ministry levels? 
The research mission is a descriptive one more than anything. I do not have previous 
expertise of any kind concerning development cooperation or controlling it. Thus, the 
research to be carried out will consist of, figuratively speaking, voyaging on dark waters and 
searching for the correct lighthouses. Instead of trying to comprehend a portioned part of a 
certain legal structure and establish a condensed interpretative argument, the goal of this 
paper is to build an interpretation of the legal system surrounding a limited theme (the control 
of development cooperation). 
1.2.3 Scope 
As Dann points out, the law of development cooperation is the law of ODA. No civilian, 
private, unlawful or otherwise unofficial fund transfer can be classified as ODA. Thus, only 
the budget, appropriations and funding decisions delegated to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
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of Finland will be assessed (the so called ODA budget). This essentially means main division 
of expenditure 24, chapter 30, items 66, 80 and 8922 of the state budget. Item 50 exists in the 
chapter, but it has not been granted appropriations in years. Actual development cooperation 
has currently been appropriated about 597 million euros for the year 2016, while the whole 
sum of development cooperation operated by the state has been appropriated about 714 million 
euros.23 The scope will also be limited to the jurisdiction of Finland. Audits, operations etc. 
carried out in developing countries will be excluded since the Finnish state has no authority or 
the power of law over a sovereign state. The thesis’ focal point will be Finnish Law and the 
legal mechanisms that can be placed inside the Finnish system. Despite the aforementioned, 
international material that has a legal effect on Finnish legislation will not be excluded. 
Concurrently, the foreign aid of other public bodies, other states, public-private partnerships, 
non-governmental organizations (NGO), or international organizations will be ignored. 
Development aid is controlled by multiple overlapping Finnish entities: Parliament, the MFA 
itself, the National Audit Office of Finland (NAO), the police, the Financial Supervisory 
Authority, the media, international organizations and NGOs. The thesis will focus on control 
mechanisms dedicated directly to control like parliamentary budgeting, MFA and its 
operational units, state agencies and functions (e.g. NAO and the Government’s financial 
controller function). The paper will not focus on a separate part or function of control (e.g. 
auditing, internal control, evaluation) but on control as a legal duty of the State. 
1.2.4 Method 
The thesis will utilize legal doctrine as its main method of study i.e. it will examine what the 
statutes and norms tell us. Van Hoecke has described in his article ‘Legal Doctrine: Which 
Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ multiple different disciplines of legal doctrine e.g. 
the hermeneutic, argumentative, empirical, explanatory and normative disciplines24. He 
concludes that legal doctrine is mainly a hermeneutic discipline with elements of the other 
traits25 and that the desired end sate of legal doctrine is a legal theory. Van Hoecke defines a 
theory in law as “a system of coherent, non contradictory assertions, views and concepts 
                                                 
22 Item 89 was created in Budget Proposal 2016 as a replacement for item 88. 
23 Ministry of Finance [budjetti.vm.fi]: GP 30/2015 ps: BP for the year 2016, main division 24, chapter 30. 
24 Van Hoecke 2011 pp. 4–11. 
25 Idem p. 17. 
8 
 
concerning some legal system or part of it, which are worded in such a way that it is possible 
to deduct from them testable hypotheses about the existence (validity) and interpretation of 
legal concepts, rules or principles26.” 
The hermeneutic discipline gives us that the main research object of legal doctrine is the 
interpretation of text and literature (e.g. laws and treaties). Interpretation is described as a goal, 
to which arguments guide us in. Arguments are used in situations where text does not exist like 
gaps in law (argumentative discipline). According to the empirical discipline, it is the job of 
legal doctrine to find out what the “legislator really meant”. Empirical data on legal issues can 
be found through text analysis, logic, field research, statistics etc. Van Hoecke reminds us that 
legal data and ultimately interpretations cannot be influenced by empirical data, but agrees that 
legal arguments might be swayed through empirical observations.27 
According to the explanatory discipline, legal doctrine is about explaining why a rule is valid. 
Validity may rise from economical, sociological etc. standpoints or through internal logic (such 
as a higher norm). Finally, the normative discipline gives us that legal doctrine is about 
describing and systematizing i.e. choosing normatively among values and principles. Van 
Hoecke writes that the normative discipline is a search for the “better law” by utilizing sources 
external to law like economy, moral, history or politics. Thus, the normative approach forces 
us to use empirical data when searching for the “better law” in relation to a set view.28 
I am not exactly sure if a thesis needs to select one separate discipline from the get-go to support 
its interpretive direction. Rather, shouldn’t the most suitable disciplines be used when facing 
problems? For example, since the subject at hand contains numerous gaps of law and empty 
espaces juridiques, it is only natural that we argument them with observations from other fields 
of science. For example, the definitions of control and effectiveness are fundamentally based 
on auditing and evaluation material and not solely on formal legal sources. On the other hand, 
we can search for a better law of control through external sources like control reports. 
Concurrently, as we systematize soft law together with international and parliamentary law, we 
are searching for the validity of these norms. 
On the subject of the empirical discipline, Ekins has summarized and augmented Dworkin’s 
thoughts on the legislature’s intent. Ekins points out that Dworkin did not believe in a construct 
                                                 
26 Van Hoecke 2011 p. 15. 
27 Idem pp. 4–7. Citation on p. 6. 
28 Idem pp. 8–11. Citation on p. 10. 
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called legislative intent as the legislature is composed out of numerous legislators (of which 
some agree with the law and some do not). The legislature is an institution, not a single author 
of law.29 Ekins presents in his alternative theory that the legislature does have an intent when 
enacting laws. Acts are laid out by a majority vote and the laws are formed out of proposals 
that are jointly agreed upon.30 
The purpose of the legislature is to make law deliberately and for good reasons, which is to say 
for the common good. That is the purpose for which legislators act jointly and it is also the 
purpose that defines the enduring institution of the legislature, which particular legislators join 
for a time.31 
In conclusion, shouldn’t we strive to see legal norms from multiple viewpoints and not blindly 
accept them as granted, holy texts of correctness? And consistently, every interpretation or 
argument should contain a fruit of wisdom or a reasoning (ratio juris) as its foundation. 
1.2.5 Source Material 
Normative sources that are in force (de lege lata) will form the foundation of this paper. 
Normative sources are e.g. statutory texts, treaties, general principles of law. Legislative and 
executive sources of the Republic of Finland, such as domestic law, decrees, regulations and 
orders shall be mainstay of the thesis, since its focus is the state and ministry level. Nonetheless, 
we cannot simply ignore European Union legislation, United Nations statutes and other 
international law, especially in such an international topic as development cooperation. 
Therefore a reasonable amount of international law shall be incorporated into the thesis e.g. 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and primary EU law. Foreign 
legislation will only be used as an illustrative tool. 
Authoritative sources, such as scientific legal writings, shall be kept in a supportive position. 
Legal literature will be composed from both international and national sources. Sources from 
                                                 
29 Ekins 2011 pp. 435–440, 442–445. See e.g. Dworkin 1986 pp. 335–336: “It seemed a metaphysical mistake to 
take the “intention” of the legislature itself as primary so long as Hermes was in the grip of some mental-state 
version of the speaker’s meaning theory of legislative intent. So long as we think legislative intention is a matter 
of what someone has in mind and means to communicate by a vote, we must take as primary the mental states of 
particular people because institutions do not have minds, and then we must worry about how to consolidate 
individual intentions into a collective, fictitious intention.” 
30 Ekins 2011 pp. 440–441. 
31 Idem p. 441. See Van Hoecke 2011 p. 10 for his idea of “the better law”. 
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the judicial branch (case law, judgments etc.) are almost non-existent in development 
cooperation matters (especially when considering state-scale affairs) and therefore they have 
been excluded from the source material.32 One major national distinction is the so called Costa 
Rica-Instrumentarium case33, in which a pre-trial investigation and subsequent trial was held 
after the corrupt use of Finnish development cooperation funds was suspected in Costa Rica. 
The case will not be utilised in the thesis as a fair analysis of the very complex case would 
require an analysis chapter of its own. 
Most of the applicable Finnish statutes have not been translated into English (for example the 
Rules of Procedure of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 550/2008). If no translation produced 
by the Ministry of Justice was available, then the commercial MOT online dictionary (produced 
by the Kielikone limited liability company) and the government term bank Valter34 (produced 
jointly by Kielikone and the Prime Minister’s Office) were used for translating key parts of the 
statutes into English. The translation guide compiled by the Ministry of Justice was utilized as 
the basis of legal citing. Thus, for example section 1, subsection 2, paragraph 3 will be 
abbreviated as 1(2)(3)35. English translations of Finnish statutes can be viewed online at 
Finlex36. Please note that even translations by the Ministry of Justice are considered unofficial 
and only Finnish and Swedish versions are legally binding. 
Parliamentary budget material is viewable only in Finnish at the online budget service hosted 
by the Ministry of Finance37. Control-related material also compromises of state laws and 
decrees (e.g. State Budget Act 423/1988), Ministry of Finance regulations concerning sound 
budget and appropriation use, and Ministry for Foreign Affairs control documents (e.g. 
HEL7M0512-1 and HEL7M0621-11). 
1.2.6 Structure 
Three analysis chapters (2, 3 and 4) form the core of the thesis. They have been organized in a 
hierarchically declining or deductive manner i.e. the first analysis chapter deals with 
                                                 
32 See Van Hoecke 2011 pp. 11–12 for more on empirical data used in legal doctrine. 
33 See 2400/R/151/07. 
34 [mot.kielikone.fi/mot/valter/netmot.exe?UI=fi80] 
35 Ministry of Justice 2010 p. 12. 
36 [finlex.fi/en] 
37 [budjetti.vm.fi] 
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international law and the last analysis chapter mostly explores internal regulations and 
equivalent legal material. Every analysis chapter will contain a chapter summary and the last 
main chapter (5) of the thesis will be used to conclude and summarize the research carried out. 
Chapter 2 is a framework and background chapter. It will cover the international obligation to 
maintain development cooperation de jure and also explain basic characteristics of aid 
transfers. The chapter was written to ensure that everyone is on par with the paper’s setting. 
Chapter 3 deals mostly with parliamentary control over the State budget and thus the control 
of the development cooperation appropriation. Duties set forth by the Constitution and 
subsequent duties detailed in budget enactments and Ministry of Finance regulations will be 
showcased. Chapter 4 concerns actual control i.e. the different entities, functions and 
mechanisms established in order to maintain control at every level and point in administrative 
operations of development cooperation funding. 
The chapters’ substance has been compiled in order to satisfy three pragmatic aspects of 
control: a) why to control, b) what to control and c) how to control. For example, it is hardly 
rational to lecture about control if we do not know what to control. Controlling land survey 
assets and rural development programmes of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is vastly 
different from controlling foreign aid. In a similar sense, it would be foolhardy to research the 
legal aspect of control if there truly did not exist an obligation to control. 
1.3 The Position of Soft Law 
A monumental quantity of development cooperation law does not actually compromise of 
binding legal instruments, but of recommendations, consensuses, declarations, action plans and 
standards. For example, Finland does not have a law regulating foreign aid specifically and at 
its core, the duty to convey development aid is based on United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions. International law and development cooperation law is dominated by soft law. For 
example, Cárdenas Castañeda believes that “the primary and supreme source of international 
law is international practice” 38. In the world of international law, where no universal legislator 
exists, the acceptance and consent of the states is more of a common denominator for suitable 
law instead of hard legislation. Ergo, Cárdenas Castañeda calls the formation of international 
                                                 
38 Cárdenas Castañeda 2013 p. 358, 395. 
12 
 
law ascertainment (defining of law) instead of law making. According to him, today’s soft law 
will be tomorrow’s hard law.39 Chinkin has defined the following characteristics of soft law: 
i) they have been articulated in non-binding form according to traditional modes of law-making 
ii) they contain vague and imprecise terms 
iii) they emanate from bodies lacking international law-making authority 
iv) they are directed to non-States actors whose practice cannot constitute customary international 
law 
v) they lack any corresponding theory of responsibility 
vi) they are based solely upon voluntary adherence, or rely upon non-juridical means of 
enforcement40 
Hasanat states in his dissertation for the University of Lapland that there is no clear answer if 
soft law creates responsibilities and that there are conflicting views on the legal and binding 
characters of soft law41. In the context of EU law, Ojanen states that while soft law might not 
be legally binding, it can still have legal effects. For example, soft law can (such as a statement 
by the Commission) act as interpretive tool for the European Court of Justice and national 
courts have a duty to follow EU soft law.42 Therefore, in order to truly understand development 
cooperation and its control as a legal phenomenon, we must accept soft law as a valid source. 
But we must also recognize soft law’s quasi-legal and non-binding state while we use it to 
interpret and systematize law. For example, a Government Programme is usually understood 
as a political document43 and without legal basis. Myllymäki asserts that the Government 
Programme is exceptionally strong indicator of political will44. Control directives and 
recommendations issued by the State are riddled with material equivalent with soft law. This 
thesis will treat OECD standards, Government Programmes, formal regulations and similar 
sources as soft law. Soft law itself will be treated as an acceptable source of legal information 
that can attribute to legal effects although its impact will be viewed in relation to hard law. But 
even when taking such a stance, the place of soft law in legal hierarchy must always be 
scrutinized. 
                                                 
39 Idem pp. 357, 361–362, 396. 
40 Chinkin 2000 p. 30. 
41 Hasanat 2012 pp. 55–58. For example, the International Court of Justice has opted that “whenever States enter 
into a commitment, it is a legal one”, see p. 56. 
42 Ojanen 2010 p. 48. 
43 See e.g. Jyränki - Husa 2012 p. 265. Jyränki and Husa state that the Government Programme has become 
increasingly more important in defining the State Budget. 
44 Myllymäki 2007 p. 5. 
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1.4 Major Definitions 
The mechanism or instrument of transferring funds, goods and expertise from developed 
countries to developing countries is called development cooperation in this thesis. Statutes of 
official European Union and Finnish aid are also called development cooperation. Other 
common names associated with development cooperation are development assistance, 
development intervention, technical assistance, international aid, development aid, overseas 
aid, or foreign aid. Different versions will be used throughout this paper in order to limit 
repetition. Humanitarian assistance (e.g. the Haiti earthquake crisis of 2010) is a subcategory 
of development cooperation. 
Official development assistance (ODA) is development cooperation funding measured by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC). DAC defines ODA as follows: 
Official development assistance is defined as those flows to countries and territories on the 
DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are: 
i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive 
agencies; and 
ii) each transaction of which: 
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as its main objective; and 
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated 
at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).45 
ODA Flow is the movement of official development assistance capital from one place to 
another. In actuality, this means transactions from one bank account to the next or similar 
exchanges. But transferring the ownership of e.g. machinery to another entity also generates 
cash flow. Concordantly ODA flow could be called e.g. money flow, resource flow, cash flow, 
fund flow or capital flow. In this thesis, simply put, ODA flow is a general term for any form 
of development cooperation funding sent to developing states. Control is aimed at supervising 
the legality and appropriateness of these flows. OECD separates flows into different 
subcategories when measuring ODA e.g. Other Official Flows (OOF), private flows, net flow 
and multilateral outflows46. But for the sake of this thesis, ODA flow will be treated as a single 
entity. 
                                                 
45 OECD 2013a p. 7. 
46 See OECD 27 September 2015 for more information. 
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The control of actions spans a great many things. In short, control could be described as keeping 
the tabs or keeping check of something. Control is management of risks. In financial matters, 
this means checking that the allocated resources are used efficiently for the task they were 
assigned to in compliance with the owner’s requirements i.e. the resources are flowing 
correctly. But in the public sector, the objective of control is also to ensure the legality of 
administrative actions. Synonyms to the concept include words like ‘monitoring’ and 
‘supervising’, while the word control is predominantly used in auditing and evaluation 
perspectives. Contra, the MFA uses monitoring instead of control47. As a general term, control 
encompasses different instruments, like audit, evaluation, sampling, risk assessment and 
communications. Control can be roughly divided into ex ante (pre-emptive), current 
(monitoring) and ex post (audit and evaluation) phases. Organizationally control can be divided 
to internal and external control. 
For example, EU defines control as follows in the Financial Regulation48 article (2)(1)(r): 
"[C]ontrol" means any measure taken to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy of operations, the reliability of reporting, the safeguarding 
of assets and information, the prevention and detection and correction of fraud and irregularities 
and their follow-up, and the adequate management of the risks relating to the legality and 
regularity of the underlying transactions, taking into account the multiannual character of 
programmes as well as the nature of the payments concerned. Controls may involve various 
checks, as well as the implementation of any policies and procedures to achieve the objectives 
described in the first sentence; 
                                                 
47 See [http://formin.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=49317&contentlan=2&culture=en-US] 
48 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on 
the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 1605/2002. 
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2 Official Development Assistance Flow 
2.1 Why is Development Cooperation Organized de jure? 
2.1.1 United Nations – the Legal Tinder 
The purpose of this first main analysis chapter is to explore the jurisdictional framework of the 
thesis and, in order to facilitate that objective, answer two questions: 
1) Why is capital transferred to developing states de jure and 
2) how are the fund transfers categorized in practice? 
To start off the thesis and answer the first question, we shall cover the jurisdictional track of 
the obligation to organize development cooperation from the top of legal hierarchy to the field 
level. International aid is a global phenomenon even when legally speaking and it is to be 
understood as one. Consequently, this chapter shall start from the international organization 
connecting the world: The United Nations. 
Finland has been a member of the United Nations since 14 December 195549. Therefore Finland 
is subject to UN law and to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council 
pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations article 2, paragraph 2: 
All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, 
shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present 
Charter.50 
                                                 
49 UNGA Resolution 995. 
50 Kolb describes the nature of the paragraph as a “respect of promises (pacta sunt servanda)”. The paragraph’s 
objective is to ensure that international treaties are not “mere scraps of paper”. The term was first used by the 
German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg after Britain declared war on Germany. Kolb also notes that the paragraph 
is not without limits and its obligations are not absolute. See Kolb 2010 pp. 40–44. Citations on pp. 40 and 41. 
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Article 2, paragraph 551 of the Charter supports UN goals. The global foundation of modern 
development aid law is laid down in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 
55/2 adopted on 18 September 2000: the Millennium Declaration. The Declaration is a 
comprehensive tool on multiple development-related subjects and set out development goals 
for each category. It consists of nine parts: Values and principles; Peace, security and 
disarmament; Development and poverty eradication; Protecting our common environment; 
Human rights, democracy and good governance; Protecting the vulnerable; Meeting the special 
needs of Africa; and Strengthening the United Nations. 
The defined goals and targets set out in the resolution were named Millennium Development 
Goals (table 1). The goals are written out in a declarative-operative manner as is typical of 
resolutions. For example, paragraph 11 of part III is set as follows: “We will spare no effort to 
free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of 
extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected. We are 
committed to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire 
human race from want.” The goal is then followed by more detailed targets like paragraph 12 
of part III: “We resolve therefore to create an environment – at the national and global levels 
alike – which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.” 
Early on the goals were described as a catalyst and a big push on development aid. They also 
represented an international consensus and an international political legitimacy on future 
development policies. The goals had their fair share of criticism: lack of ambition in targets 
like poverty, hunger and slum dweller life, but also over-ambitiousness in for example the 
universal education target.52 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 “All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the 
present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking 
preventive or enforcement action.” 
52 Langford – Summer – Yamin 2013 pp. 1–3. 
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Table 1 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and targets53 
Goal 1 – Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Target 1.A: halve the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day (between 
1990 and 2015) 
Target 1.B: achieve full and productive employment for all, including women and young 
people 
Target 1.C: halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger (1990–2015) 
Goal 2 – Achieve universal primary education 
Target 2.A: ensure that, by 2015, all children will be able to complete a full course of 
primary schooling 
Goal 3 - Promote gender equality and empower women 
Target 3.A: eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 
2005, and in all levels of education no later 2015 
Goal 4 – Reduce child mortality 
Target 4.A: reduce by two thirds the under-five mortality rate (1990–2015) 
Goal 5 – Improve maternal health 
Target 5.A: reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio (1990–2015) 
Target 5.B: achieve by 2015, universal access to reproductive health 
Goal 6 – Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Target 6.A: have halved by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
Target 6.B: achieve by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIVS/AIDS for all those 
who need it 
Target 6.C: have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other 
major diseases 
Goal 7 – Ensure environmental sustainability 
Target 7.A: integrate the principles of sustainable development into county policies and 
programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources 
Target 7.B: reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate 
of loss 
Target 7.C: halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation 
Target 7.D: have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers 
Goal 8 – Develop a global partnership for development 
Targets 8.A–8.D: cover aid, trade, debt, landlocked, and small-island States 
Target 8.E: in cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable 
essential drugs in developing countries 
Target 8.F: make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and 
communications technologies 
 
                                                 
53 The general layout of the table shown here is widely used by the UN and other international organizations. The 
source of this exact table is Langford – Summer – Yamin 2013 p. 2. Note that some targets were added or 
rearranged in 2005 by the UNGA e.g. the inclusion in Target 5.B on reproductive health. 
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Table 2 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)54 
Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere 
Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture 
Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages 
Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all 
Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls 
Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all 
Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all 
Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all 
Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization 
and foster innovation 
Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries 
Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable 
Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns 
Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts* 
Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for 
sustainable development 
Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, 
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss 
Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide 
access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions 
at all levels 
Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for 
sustainable development 
* Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the 
primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate 
change. 
The new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were unanimously adopted by UNGA on 25 
September 2015 as Resolution 70/1 and the new goals shall come into effect on 01 January 
                                                 
54 UNGA Resolution 70/1 paragraph 59. The SDGs can be easily viewed at 
[sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics]. 
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2016 (paragraph 21). As the Millennium Declaration, the preamble of the SDGs contains noble 
objectives and starts off with the following words: 
This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity. It also seeks to strengthen 
universal peace in larger freedom. We recognise that eradicating poverty in all its forms and 
dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an indispensable 
requirement for sustainable development. 
The SDGs expand the MDGs by multifold (table 2). The SDGs contain 169 individual targets, 
whereas the MDGs consisted of “only” 21 targets. The MDG targets could be displayed on one 
page in this thesis, whereas the SDG targets would encompass multiple pages. For example the 
goal of target 7.1 is to “[b]y 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern 
energy services” and the goal of target 15.5 is to “[t]ake urgent and significant action to reduce 
the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and 
prevent the extinction of threatened species”. (Resolution 70/1 paragraph 59.) 
Another important UN instrument in foreign aid is the so called ‘0.7 % official development 
assistance (ODA) / gross national income (GNI)’ target. The 0.7 % ODA / GNI target sets out 
that ODA should amount to 0.7 % of the donor’s GNI pursuant to the UNGA Resolution 2626 
of 1970 and its paragraph 43: 
In recognition of the special importance of the role which can be fulfilled only by official 
development assistance, a major part of financial resource transfers to the developing countries 
should be provided in the form of official development assistance. Each economically advanced 
country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing countries 
and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 per cent of its gross national 
product at market prices by the middle of the Decade. 
Resolution 2626 links OECD regulations and standards (especially ODA) to the MDGs. 
Originally the target was calculated based on the ratio of ODA and GNP. With the advent of 
UN’s System of National Accounts in 1993, gross national product was exchanged for gross 
national income55. The above cited paragraph is the reason why most developed countries strive 
to reach the 0.7 % ODA / GNI target. 
The Charter of United Nations articles 10 and 12 deem that the UNGA can only issue 
recommendations to Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council within the scope 
                                                 
55 OECD 2003 p. III-11; United Nations 1993 p. 201. The System of National Accounts was revised in 2008, but 
it maintained the ODA/GNI ratio. 
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of the Charter, any of its organs or on peaceful adjustment of any situation.  Therefore, UNGA 
is not considered a legislator and its resolutions are considered legally non-binding by 
international law56. Even though it does not legally bind Finland to any development 
cooperation, the Millennium Declaration, Resolution 2626 and Resolution 70/1 (SDGs) can be 
placed on the highest tier of soft law. Fukuda-Parr and Hulme even describe the MDGs as a 
super-norm that formed out of mankind’s duty to eradicate poverty. This super-norm combines 
many individual norms into a defined system and its objective is to achieve more than the sum 
of its parts.57 
Fukuda-Parr and Hulme note that the average shelf life of a UNGA resolution is mere days i.e. 
they are superficial instruments. Instead the Millennium Declaration became a central strategy 
for national governments and international agencies. It also sparked activity in organs like the 
World Bank and the United States Government. On the other hand the MDGs received some 
opposition from international NGOs and developing countries for the undemocratic and non-
innovative nature of the goals.58 The European Union closely follows goals and trends set in 
the Millennium Declaration and has used them to re-engineer national norms59. I am confident 
enough to say that the new SDGs are at least on the same legal level as the MDGs. 
The MDGs, the 0.7 % ODA/GNI and the SDGs target can be described as more political (like 
the super-norm feature) than legal instruments. They do not have binding legal power, but have 
nonetheless attributed to legal effects. Thus they act as a motor and justification for subsequent 
EU and national legislative measures regarding development aid. For example, UK was the 
first G7 nation to institute the 0.7 % ODA/GNI target into national legislation as a duty of the 
government in March 201560. 
                                                 
56 Kolb 2010 p. 124. As Kolb puts it, “[t]he Assembly may discuss and recommend; it may not decide”. 
57 Fukuda-Parr – Hulme 2009 p. 5. 
58 Idem pp. 14–18. The US increased around $ 5 billion more per annum in development aid after the Millennium 
Declaration even though the MDGs were not totally approved by the US Government.  
59 Idem pp. 29–30. 
60 The Guardian 9 March 2015; International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 
section 1(1): “It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the target for official development assistance 
(referred to in this Act as “ODA”) to amount to 0.7% of gross national income (in this Act referred to as “the 0.7 
% target”) is met by the United Kingdom in the year 2015 and each subsequent calendar year.” 
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2.1.2 From EU Law to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
In the context of this thesis, the border between UNGA resolutions and EU law is also the 
border of soft law and hard law, respectively. In other words, while the before cited UN law 
does not have a binding legal effect, EU law is binding for the State of Finland. This supremacy 
or primacy doctrine of EU law in relation to Member State legislation was laid out in the 
European Court of Rights case COSTA v. Enel of 196461. 
The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are 
hierarchically the highest governing enactments in terms of the EU. Both treaties were 
amended recently by the Treaty of Lisbon62. Finland has been a member of the EU since 199563. 
TEU enacts the general provisions on which the EU and its external actions are currently 
structured upon. Art. 21, para. 1, first subpara. of TEU sets out that in the international scene 
the EU shall advance inter alia the rule of law, respect for human dignity, and respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
Point (d) of paragraph 2(1) focuses more on the specific EU development goal of eradicating 
poverty: 
The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree 
of cooperation in all fields of international relations in order to foster the sustainable economic, 
social and environmental development of developing countries with the primary aim of 
eradicating poverty. 
Similar goals are laid out e.g. for democracy and humanitarian assistance in points (b) and (g) 
respectively. Whereas TEU is more of a structuring statute with large-scale principles, the 
TFEU concerns and sets forth actual operations of the EU. 
TFEU art. 4(4) lays out that the Union shall have competence to act in the areas of development 
cooperation and humanitarian assistance, but that the Member States shall have freedom to act 
in the aforementioned areas. Part Five of TFEU deals with the external action of the EU and 
sets forth more detailed provisions on cooperation with third countries and humanitarian 
assistance. First of all, TFEU art. 201 provides us that the external policy shall follow the 
                                                 
61 Also see Ojanen 2010 pp. 74–77; Wacker 2009 pp. 82–83. 
62 The Treaty of Lisbon came into effect on 1 December 2009 (see Art. 6(2)) although it was signed on 13 
December 2007. 
63 Act Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Finland to the European Union (102/1994) entered into force 
on 1.1.1995 as laid out in the Decree Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Finland to the European Union 
(103/1994). 
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guidelines set by inter alia the aforementioned TEU article 21. According to TFEU article 208 
paragraphs 1(2) and 2, the Union is committed to development cooperation and UN goals: 
Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in 
the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of 
development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing 
countries. 
The Union and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the 
objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent 
international organisations. 
The EU has been politically committed to the aforementioned goals for a long time. For 
example, in 2006 the EU stated its commitment in the European Consensus on Development. 
In May 2015, the Council of the European Union politically reaffirmed its commitment to 
eradicate poverty and to reach goals set out by the UN and the 0.7 % ODA/GNI target64. From 
the EU law, we move on to the national legislation of Finland. 
The Constitution of Finland (731/1999) section 1(3)65 states that Finland participates in 
international co-operation for the protection of peace and human rights and for the development 
of society. Section 1(3) can for example be tied directly to the preamble of UNGA resolution 
2626 where the values and aims of international co-operation are reviewed in detail. § 1(3) is 
also known as the constitutional internationality principle66. It came into force as a new 
provision with the reform of the Constitution on 1 March 2000. The participation of Finland in 
numerous international organizations (UN, EU, Council of Europe etc.), multi- and bilateral 
treaties, and international cooperation in general, was deemed so important that it afforded a 
new provision. The aforementioned objectives were intentionally set “quite open” and they 
were not meant to be interpreted as exhaustive nor as delimiting.67 
A vaguer link can be found within chapter 2 since it concerns basic rights and liberties. As is 
internationally usual, the basic rights and liberties as provided by the Constitution belong to 
everyone. For example section 6(1) states that everyone is equal before the law and section 
7(1) states that everyone has the right to life, personal liberty, integrity and security. Moreover, 
according to section 22 the public authorities of the State shall guarantee the observance of 
                                                 
64 Council of the European Union 2015. See p. 11 especially for ODA commitments. 
65 Please note that Finnish statutes are formed out of sections, subsections and paragraphs. 
66 Jyränki - Husa 2012 pp. 116–117. 
67 GP 1/1998 ps p. 73. 
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basic rights and liberties and human rights. The same positive obligations can be detected in 
international conventions and treaties that Finland has ratified, for example the European 
Convention on Human Rights68 and the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights69. The 
Millennium Declaration and Resolution 70/1 contains similar fundamental values. The 
Government of Finland vouched for a human rights-based approach to development in 201270 
and Seppänen has argued that “defining development cooperation objectives through human 
rights is sufficiently ambiguous to be politically acceptable”71. Despite the aforementioned, the 
espace juridique between human rights and development cooperation is not clearly set and 
there does not seem to be an indication of a binding nature. 
It can be concluded that the State of Finland and its public authorities are not bound de jure by 
the Constitution to assist everyone in the world in securing their rights. But chapter 2 
nevertheless forms a political and moral pledge to uphold effective development cooperation. 
This is especially the case when interpreted together with section 1(3) of the Constitution, EU 
enactments, UN law and human rights treaties. 
According to sections 67 and 68 of the Constitution, only the most significant and important 
decisions are made by the Government. Most matters are decided at the Ministry to which the 
matter belongs to. Also each Ministry, within its proper purview, is responsible for the 
preparation of matters to be considered by the Government and for the appropriate functioning 
of administration. More detailed provisions and provisions on the purviews are laid down in 
the Government Act (175/2003). 
Section 7(2) of the Government Act sets forth that further provisions on the organization and 
operations of ministries can be laid down in a government decree and a ministry decree (rules 
of procedures). Accordingly, the purview and function of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland is laid down in the Government Rules of Procedure (GROP, 232/2006). GROP is a 
subordinate statute (a government decree) of the Government Act. According to section 1 of 
the GROP, it defines common provisions on the mandate of the ministries. Matters shall be 
divided up according to the Ministries’ mandates as laid down in and the competent Ministry 
shall handle the issue (§ 10). Section 13 specifically states the mandate of the Ministry for 
                                                 
68 Finland is a party of the Convention, see FTS 18–19/1990. Finland is also a signatory of Protocols number 15 
and number 16. The aforementioned Protocols are not in force yet. 
69 The Charter of Fundamental Rights is legally binding for Member States of the EU. It has the same legal value 
as the EU Treaties themselves. See TEU Art 6(1). 
70 Finland’s Development Policy Programme 2012 pp. 11-21. 
71 Seppänen 2007 p. 247.  
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Foreign Affairs. In addition to usual foreign policy tasks e.g. assistance in the coordination of 
treaties, trade policy and diplomatic missions, the mandate of the MFA also covers 
development policy and development cooperation pursuant to section 4(1) paragraph 4. 
And thus we have paved a simple jurisdictional chain from the UN and the EU to the MFA. 
Note that the purpose of chapter 2.1 was only to view the obligatory chain from the global level 
to the MFA. The budgetary process, financial management and the functions of the MFA will 
be defined more in chapters 3 and 4. But next we will review how development cooperation is 
actually defined internationally as a transfer. 
2.2 How is Development Cooperation Classified in Practice? 
2.2.1 Role of the OECD in Shaping Foreign Aid 
If the UN is the umbrella organization for the legal and political drive in development 
cooperation, then OECD can be described as the umbrella of foreign aid structuring, 
standardization and statistics. OECD was formed by the Convention on the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development in 1960. Finland has been a member of the 
Convention since 196972. According to Article 1 of the Convention, the main aims of the OECD 
are  
(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of 
living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and to contribute to the 
development of the world economy; 
(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in 
the process of economic development; and 
(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in 
accordance with international obligations. 
                                                 
72 OECD 28 August 2015. 
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OECD organizes the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in which multiple agreements 
linking and conforming aid goals have been signed by majority of the world’s states. Finland 
adheres to the agreements of the aforementioned Fora73. The three latest declarations are the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005, Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 and the 
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation Agreement of 2011 at the second, 
third and fourth Forum respectively. As the name of the Fora implies, these declarations set in 
motion different principles that aim to provide more effective development cooperation. For 
example, the Busan Partnership lays out two principles: 1) ownership of development priorities 
by developing countries and 2) transparency and accountability to beneficiaries, citizens and 
organisations (paragraph 11). The declarations also contribute to e.g. development cooperation 
evaluation standards. 
The OECD organ responsible for development aid matters is the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). The Committee was created in 1960 to oversee the development sector of 
OECD. DAC is a part of OECD’s organization and its mandate for the period 2010–2015 is as 
follows: 
The overarching objective of the DAC is to promote development co-operation and other policies 
so as to contribute to sustainable development, including pro-poor economic growth, poverty 
reduction, improvement of living standards in developing countries, and to a future in which no 
country will depend on aid.74 
OECD and DAC are the de facto organizers of global development cooperation. Finland is 
member of DAC as well as the OECD. While political decisions concerning foreign aid are 
made at the UN, DAC guides, standardizes and evaluates data & information concerning aid 
among donor countries and entities. DAC, so to speak, upholds control on global development 
assistance.75 
                                                 
73 See e.g. Ministry of Finance [budjetti.vm.fi]: Consolidated BP for the year 2015, main division 24, chapter 30, 
p. 2. Retrieved 06 September 2015. 
74 OECD 2010b p. 2–3. Specific goals of DAC are included in the resolution of the council e.g. “a) monitor, assess, 
report, and promote the provision of resources that support sustainable development, as specified above, by 
collecting and analysing data and information on ODA and other official and private flows” and “d) analyse and 
help shape the rapidly evolving global development architecture to optimise development results.” 
75 Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) provides technical assistance and support to DAC. DCD e.g. 
monitors aid statistics and performs evaluations of development programmes and aid effectiveness. See 
[www.oecd.org/dac/developmentco-operationdirectoratedcd.htm]. 
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2.2.2 Categorization of Official Development Assistance 
Legal provisions do not give us a clear view on how a development cooperation process 
actually behaves e.g. how much money is granted, on what region is it focused on, what specific 
projects it will support, how will the money be transferred and how will the aid be monitored. 
If we are to know what the law of ODA is, then we must know what ODA flows are. This is 
especially important from a control perspective since you cannot control what you do not know. 
Finland also has the obligation to meet the 0.7 % ODA/GNI goal and ODA does not suddenly 
emerge by itself from State accounting. It must be categorized, accounted and submitted 
according to OECD specifications. 
Development cooperation flow categorization can be explored through OECD standards. 
Funded projects and programmes are essentially classified with DAC codes used in the OECDs 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS). The CRS is a statistical framework under which data is 
gathered on multiple parameters from official development assistance (ODA) flow.  Since 
DAC maintains statistical data with CRS and evaluates development cooperation at a global 
level, it is rational to classify development aid projects with their framework.76 The MFA’s 
case management system houses data in similar fashion according to the DAC classifications77. 
The classification represented below is a streamlined one, but yet it gives a basic understanding 
of a development cooperation funding’s dimensions78. The categorization here is divided into 
five categories. 
The first and foremost category is the geographical location of the recipient i.e. the targeted 
country or region. Not all development aid flow is targeted at a single country since some 
harmful phenomena do not conform to borders.79 For example, Finland decided to fund the 
World Food Programme counteraction against Ebola and coinciding food aid with 1 000 000 
€ in December 2014. The targeted region of the project was laid out as Africa.80 On the other 
                                                 
76 More information available at [www.oecd.org/dac/stats] on DACs statistical methodology. 
77 See [formin.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=48019&contentlan=2&culture=en-US] where info on funding 
decisions is uploaded publicly. 
78 The DAC code list contains more parameters than presented here. For example, type of finance and type of flow 
are also measured. The parameters selected for this thesis are based upon the author’s discretion of a true and fair 
view. 
79 OECD 2013b p. 55–56. The geographical distribution of ODA flows for the year 2015 can be viewed at 
[www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/geographical-distribution-of-financial-flows-to-developing-countries-
2015_fin_flows_dev-2015-en-fr]. More flow data can be found at [www.aidflows.org]. 
80 UHA2014-051955. 
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hand, in February 2015 a decision was made to fund the training of civil servants and journalists 
solely in Somalia with 69 000 €81. 
The funds might be transferred to the recipient government directly, to an NGO82, a private 
public partnership83 (PPP), a UN body, or any other multilateral organization, university, 
research institute, fund etc. The DAC channel of delivery defines the funding channel. DAC 
also separates between bilateral or multilateral funding i.e. if the funds are channelled directly 
between governments or if the funding is contributed from the core government to a 
multilateral organization.84  
For example, in May 2015 the MFA decided to fund an environment and bio-diversity program 
with 3 026 000 euros. The funds were transferred to the Asian Development Bank and target 
region was labelled as the Mekong-river.85 
Type of aid determines how the recipient will be able to use funds granted by the donor. The 
aid type can be divided into six main classes: A) budget support, B) core contributions and 
pooled programmes and funds, C) project-type interventions, D) experts and other technical 
assistance and E) scholarships and student costs in donor countries86. Budget support covers 
unearmarked transfers to the recipient’s treasury. It can focus either on general macroeconomic 
reforms or be specified to a single sector. According to the DAC manual “[b]udget support is 
a method of financing a recipient country’s budget through a transfer of resources from an 
external financing agency to the recipient government’s national treasury”87. 
Class B) is defined as follows: “-- the donor relinquishes the exclusive control of its funds by 
sharing the responsibility with other stakeholders (other donors, NGOs, multilateral 
institutions, Public Private Partnerships)”. The funds are thus transferred to a third party, to an 
account operated jointly by third parties, to a specific programme operated by a third party etc. 
The key difference from budget support is that the funds are under the control of a third 
organization instead of the recipient state.88 
                                                 
81 UHA2014-047574. 
82 For example Doctors without Borders (‘Médecins Sans Frontières’ in French) or International Trust Fund for 
Demining and Mine Victims Assistance. 
83 For example Microfinance Enhancement Facility. 
84 OECD 2013b p. 57–59. 
85 UHA2015-015563. 
86 OECD 2013b p. 63–68. One additional category exists, but it was omitted from the thesis: G) administration 
costs not included elsewhere. 
87 Idem p. 63. 
88 OECD 2013b pp. 63–64. 
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Class C) pinpoints the target even more. Whereas core contributions might be transferred for a 
specific theme, project-type interventions are intended to fund a detailed project with deliberate 
inputs, activities, outputs and fixed performance goals. Class E) consists of sending 
consultants, teachers, researchers, interns and so on to the recipient country. Class G) includes 
supporting the education of recipient country nationals with grant funding.89 For example, the 
MFA is currently supporting multiple project-type interventions with 2 650 000 € in Mazar-e-
Sharif of Afghanistan. The projects include inter alia UNICEF’s WASH project targeting water 
and sanitation issues, and the Justice for Women project focusing on women’s rights and 
participation in legal affairs.90 
The fourth category is the sector of destination91 as set out by the DAC purpose codes. Sector 
of destination responds to the question "which specific area of the recipient's economic and 
social structure is the transfer intended to foster"92. DAC purpose codes cover all the sectors 
that aid can be targeted to e.g. agriculture, communication, education, health and tourism. More 
accurate sector examples include, but are not limited to: child soldiers (prevention and 
demobilisation), basic nutrition, debt forgiveness, fertilizer minerals, health personnel 
development, human rights, livestock, malaria control and teacher training. The sectors are 
self-explanatory, but a more detailed description of, for example, the basic nutrition (code 
12240) sector aid according to the CRS code list is as follows:93 
Direct feeding programmes (maternal feeding, breastfeeding and weaning foods, child feeding, 
school feeding); determination of micro-nutrient deficiencies; provision of vitamin A, iodine, 
iron etc.; monitoring of nutritional status; nutrition and food hygiene education; household food 
security94. 
The aforementioned funding decision to train Somalian civil servants and journalists was 
categorized by the purpose codes as 30 % democratic participation and civil society, 40 % 
media and free flow of information, and 30 % human rights. Whereas the aforementioned 
environment and bio-diversity program at Mekong-river was coded as 50 % environmental 
policy and administrative management, and 50 % bio-diversity. 
                                                 
89 Idem pp. 65–67. 
90 UHA2014-046792. 
91 MFA uses the phrase ‘field of activity’ instead. 
92 OECD 2013b p. 69. 
93 Idem p. 69–94. 
94 Idem p. 73. 
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The fifth and last category are the markers. The markers determine the descriptive level of 
involvement on various policy objectives e.g. biodiversity, climate change - adaptation and 
gender equality. They are used inter alia to tie development cooperation to UN goals like the 
MDGs and the Rio Conventions95. A marker can be labelled by the donor country as a principal 
objective, a significant objective or not targeted according to how the aid was intended to be 
used to achieve the policy outcome.96 
The aforementioned categorization is comprised of multiple overlapping classifications, but 
yet it simply answers basic questions related to funds e.g. to where, to whom, by whom, how 
and to which sector. The actual transfer process of development cooperation funds itself is 
relatively simple. Funds might flow to a recipient country through e.g. a bank transfer from the 
donor country’s treasury to the recipient country’s treasury or to the bank account of an NGO 
project97. Equipment can be sent via convoys or shipping lanes while experts can be flown to 
the destination through air flights. A debt relief agreement can be signed between the parties 
and the debt removed from the Finnish State’s central bookkeeping. 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
Jurisdictionally, development cooperation can be understood as a relatively simple chain of 
commands: An “order” to organize development cooperation arrives down the jurisdictional 
track from the combined legal base of the UN, EU and national legislation to the MFA (the ‘de 
jure’ part of flow). At this point, the “order” transforms into a more technical obligation. The 
order is processed and funds are actually transferred to a developing state according to OECD 
standards and categorizations (the ‘in practice’ part of flow). Before the funds reach the 
developing state, it has to satisfy multiple prerequisites e.g. recipient, channel of delivery and 
sector of destination. Thus resources (machinery, cash, personnel) flow from the start point to 
                                                 
95 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. 
96 OECD 2013c p. 34–35. 
97 The State Treasury is in charge of State’s financial management, central bookkeeping and payment transfer 
activities. See [www.statetreasury.fi]. But actually, state capital flows through normal bank accounts. The current 
main payment transaction broker for the State is Pohjola Pankki Oyj. See 
[www.op.fi/op?cid=151672936&srcpl=4] Retrieved 20 September 2015. 
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the end point i.e. funds are transferred from developed countries capital to developing countries 
capital and development cooperation is generated (figure 1). 
THE CAUSAL START POINT OF ODA FLOW 
 “Order” start 
Flow Direction 
de jure 
UNGA resolutions  
European Union Law  
The Constitution of Finland  
Government Act  
GROP  
MFAROP  
 “Order” end  
 Developed countries capital  
in practice 
OECD standards  
Recipient  
Channel of delivery  
Type of aid  
Sector of destination  
Marker  
 Developing countries capital  
THE ACTUAL END POINT OF ODA FLOW 
Figure 1 ODA Flow in Development Cooperation 
The figure and the overall concept in this chapter is to seen as an illustrative tool rather than a 
rigid construct. For example, resources do not factually flow at the legal level, but the UN 
nevertheless represents the causal starting point of the eventual flow. If the aforementioned UN 
General Assembly resolutions did not exist, we might not see any development aid flow to 
developing states. Also the ‘de jure’ and ‘in practice’ borders form a thin red line. Nevertheless, 
the chapter and the figure provide us with a clear, albeit shallow, vision of why and how foreign 
aid is transferred from developed nations to the Third World. 
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3 Financial Administrative Law of Development Cooperation 
3.1 The State Budget 
3.1.1 Constitutional Principles and the Composition of the State Budget 
This chapter will focus on systematizing the relevant financial administrative law statutes 
together with development cooperation. In other words, this chapter will answer two integral 
questions: 
1) How is the development cooperation budget prepared and 
2) how should State entities follow the budget? 
Parliament of Finland has full of authority of central government finances. This financial power 
compromises of the budgetary, fiscal and control powers of central government finances98. 
Section 83(1) of the Constitution states that Parliament shall decide on the state budget99 i.e. 
the Government proposes the annual State budget which Parliament approves. The execution 
of the budget falls into the Government’s jurisdiction, but Parliament has ex post control of the 
budget after it has been approved.100 On the other hand, Jyränki and Husa believe that the true 
budgetary power of Parliament is quite limited, since the budget process is de facto led by the 
Government and the budget is drafted according to Government specifications101. 
According to Myllymäki, Jyränki, Husa and Wacker, the Constitution contains four pertinent 
budgetary principles. They are especially important in securing the budgetary power of 
Parliament: 
                                                 
98 The State Budget can be divided into on-budget activities and off-budget activities. Development cooperation 
is a part of the on-budget activities. Off-budget activities include e.g Yleisradio Oy, Solidium Oy and off-budget 
funds. The revenues and expenditures of off-budget activities was estimated to amount to about 5.4 billion euros. 
See GP 131/2014 ps Y72. 
99 See Wacker 2009 pp. 40–44 for more information on parliamentary budget power. 
100 Jyränki – Husa 2012 p. 259; Wacker 2009 pp. 38–39. 
101 Jyränki – Husa 2012 p. 266. 
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1) The completeness of the budget gives us that the budget shall contain all of the State’s 
revenues and expenditures with minor exceptions (§ 84(1)). The aim of the budget 
completeness is to provide a truthful and complete view of the budget. 
2) According to the annuality principle, the budget shall be laid out for a period of one financial 
year (§ 83(1)).  It ensures that Parliament is able to cope with fast and sudden changes in the 
economic atmosphere. 
3) The budget shall be compiled by gross budgeting in order to uphold the budget as full and 
as detailed as possible (§ 84(1)). In short, gross budgeting means that the revenues and 
expenditures are not added to each other, but kept as independent measures. In some minor 
cases, net budgeting (where only the sum of the revenues and expenditures is indicated) can be 
utilized. 
4) The budget shall be balanced i.e. the revenues of the State have to cover and fulfill the 
expenditures of the State (§ 84(2)).102 
Jyränki and Husa have also identified a fifth principle: Openness of the budget. It indicates that 
the tables, justifications and similar information of the budget are available to the public for 
scrutiny (§ 83(1)).103 On the other hand, Myllymäki thinks that the openness principle is more 
of administrative principle than a financial one and that it has no special attributes when 
connected to the budget104. 
The State Budget is not an act in a normative sense. It is published in a different series than 
acts, it is only in force for a year and the President has no power over the budget.105 The budget 
grants appropriations to State entities. Section 85(1) of the Constitution indicates that 
appropriations are taken up in the budget as fixed appropriations, estimated appropriations or 
transferable appropriations. Fixed appropriations cannot be exceeded or transferred without 
approval by an act, while estimated and transferable appropriations can.106 Jyränki and Husa 
define that in addition to granting the power to use State resources, appropriations set a duty to 
fulfill the desire of Parliament as set by the Budget. They continue, that if the objective of 
Parliament could be attained much more efficiently and with lower costs, then the entity would 
                                                 
102 Myllymäki 2007 pp. 58–63; Jyränki – Husa 2012 pp. 266–267; Wacker 2009 pp. 52-55. 
103 Jyränki – Husa 2012 p. 267. The openness principle can additionally be derived from § 9 of the Act on the 
Openness of Government Activities 621/1999. 
104 Myllymäki 2007 p. 58. 
105 Idem p. 78. 
106 Idem p. 74–76 on appropriation varities. 
33 
 
be obliged to fulfill the duty in such a manner.107 Wacker raises several different missions of 
the Budget of which the legal, the administrative and the political mission will be displayed 
here. According to the legal mission, the Budget is a conduit for Parliament to relay its legal 
limits to the Government and other relevant authorities. The administrative mission states that 
the budget is an administrative tool that sets financial resources and limits for the 
administration. The budget is a guidance tool with which Parliament can distribute funds to 
different sectors of the society in accordance with its policy (political mission).108 
Technically, the budget is a table of appropriated revenues and expenditures that are classified 
into administrative sectors (e.g. Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Education) according to sections 
5 and 6 of the State Budget Act 423/1988 (SBA). Inside the sectors, revenues and expenditures 
are classified even further according to the organization and the type or nature of the cash flow. 
Both cash flow types are classified into three levels e.g. expenditures are hierarchically 
classified into main divisions, chapters and items.109 Finally, the budget shall include budget 
justifications that are approved by Parliament (SBA § 8). Justifications may also contain an 
allocation plan which assesses how the expenditure item will be distributed between various 
purposes (SBA § 9). 
The development cooperation budget is a normal part of the constitutional principles and 
budgetary guidelines set here. The development cooperation budget is classified under the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and approved by Parliament. Although the aforementioned 
principles and guidelines are important in upholding a lawful and expedient budget, they are 
still relatively far away from actual development cooperation budgeting maintained at the 
Ministry level. Thus, the State budget process will be assessed more insightfully. 
3.1.2 Preparing the State Budget 
State Budget Decree 1243/1992 (SBD) defines the actual preparation and utilization of the 
budget more clearly than the Constitution or the State Budget Act. It contains numerous budget-
technical provisions110 that are too precise and case-confined to be of use in accordance with 
                                                 
107 Jyrnäki – Husa 2012 p. 269. Also see Wacker 2009 pp. 46–52 for the normative status of the Budget. 
108 Wacker 2009 p. 48. 
109 Also see Myllymäki 2007 pp. 63–66. 
110 Like § 3b of the SBA, which is titled ‘Inclusion of a surplus or a deficit in the State annual accounts in the 
State budget’. 
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the objective of the thesis. Instead, we will focus on provisions that provide general rules, 
obligations and standards for financial management rather than technical or pure accounting 
norms. This chapter is also intended to give an overview of State budgeting to the reader and 
not to pry into every minor detail. 
The State Budget is prepared according to the doctrine of ‘budgeting according to spending 
limits’ or ‘framework budgeting111’ i.e. the Government presents their political desires in the 
Government Programme, which is then transformed into State budgets. The Government 
Programme sets rough spending limits or frameworks for the different State sectors in which 
they have to operate within112. The different government agencies and administrative sectors 
(i.e. Ministries) then propose their budgets inside the spending limits or frameworks from the 
ground up till they reach the Ministry of Finance pursuant to section 1 of State Budget Decree: 
Preparation of the State budget shall comprise the following phases: 
1. drawing up framework proposals for central government finances and a Government decision 
on the framework for central government finances, 
2. drawing up budget proposals for government agencies, 
3. drawing up budget proposals for the various administrative sectors and other budget 
proposals, 
4. drawing up a Ministry of Finance Budget Proposal to be submitted to Parliament and 
5. discussion of the proposal in a plenary session of the Government. 
Finally, the Budget Proposal (BP) is submitted to Parliament, which then decides on it. An 
admitted BP becomes the State Budget. The connection between the Government Programme 
and budgeting can found within section 1b(4) of the State Budget Decree infra. 
Proposals for spending limits in central government finances, including the grounds therefore, 
and budget proposals including the grounds therefore, must be drawn up in compliance with the 
deadlines and other regulations set by the Government and the Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
                                                 
111 ‘Budgeting according to spending limits’ is the official term according to the government termbank Valter 
while ‘framework budgeting’ is a direct translation by the author. 
112 Myllymäki 2007 pp. 46–48. 
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As a supplement to the annual BPs, Ministries are also to prepare for the future when planning 
their financial capabilities: 
Operational and financial planning 
Ministries shall plan the public impact113 of their area of responsibility and the effectiveness of 
operations and operational performance in their sector several years ahead. [--] (SBA § 12(1).)114 
The aim of SBA section 12(1) is to strengthen the impact, financial efficiency and effectiveness 
of the State. According to operational and financial planning, Ministries are obliged to create 
plans of their operations for years in advance.115 Section 12 entered into force in 2004116 
through GP (Government Proposal) 56/2003 ps (parliamentary session) and was slightly 
modified (e.g. public impact was added) in 2010117. The main objective of GP 56/2003 ps was 
to overhaul the State Budget statuses and sharpen performance guidance as an essential 
strategy of central government finances118. Interestingly, operational and financial planning 
was partially indicated as useless and redundant in GP 202/2009 ps119. 
According to Myllymäki, the normative status of section 12 and especially its binding effect 
are unclear. Myllymäki explores section 12 from an administrative view and states that it sets 
a public duty for State entities to plan and the objectives to plan for. But in what regard does 
section 12 set a binding obligation to obey the plan? He concludes that it would be irrational if 
a plan would be bind an organization too tightly amidst ever-changing economic atmospheres 
as the responsiveness of a plan is one of its main characteristics. Even though a faultily planned 
plan could be against the wishes of the Government, the plans itself do not currently hold any 
legal binding effect.120 This does not of course mean that planning does not have a legal effect 
as it most surely usually is finalized as a budget proposal. Section 8 of the State Budget Decree 
lays out the purposes of SBA § 12 further: 
 
 
                                                 
113 ‘Yhteiskunnallinen vaikuttavuus’ in Finnish. Public impact could additionally be understood as e.g. public 
outcome or civic impact. 
114 Translation by the author as this particular section has not yet been translated by the Ministry of Justice. 
115 GP 56/2003 ps p. 59; Ministry of Finance 2005 pp. 17–22. 
116 Act 1216/2003. 
117 Act 1096/2009. 
118 GP 56/2013 ps p. 37–38. 
119 GP 202/2009 ps p. 7. 
120 Myllymäki 2007 pp. 50–53. 
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The purpose of operational and financial planning is: 
1) to support performance in government activities and finances; 
2) to provide grounds for preparation of the framework for central government finances and for 
the annual central government budget; 
3) to provide grounds for effectiveness in the policy sectors of the ministries and in the managing 
and steering of government agencies and likewise in setting performance targets. 
The operational and financial planning of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is performed 
at the Financial Unit according to the MFAs internal Financial Regulation121. 
3.2 Financial Duties of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
3.2.1 Adhering to the State Budget – Performance Guidance 
The Ministry of Finance created the Manual of Performance Guidance in 2005 to systematize 
performance guide at an operational level in accordance with the parliamentary authorization 
of SBA section 26 subsection 3122 and SBD section 74123. The Manual ties itself into numerous 
State budgeting provisions. For example, according to State Budget Decree section 11, the 
ministry shall inter alia approve the most important targets for effectiveness in the policy sector 
of the ministry and for the operational performance of the administrative sector and of its most 
important government agencies. The Manual reminds us of GP 56/2003 ps as the desire of 
Parliament to sharpen the performance guidance of State entities. The Manual also refers to 
SBD section 10(3) in that the operational and financial plans are to be prepared in compliance 
with the regulations issued by the Government and the Ministry of.124 
                                                 
121 Financial Unit 2015 pp. 7–13. 
122 “On those matters which are governed by decree, stipulations and instructions may also be issued by decision 
of the Ministry of Finance and in the standing orders for government agencies.” 
123 “Further provisions on the application of this Decree will be issued as necessary by the 
Ministry of Finance.” 
124 Ministry of Finance 2005 p. 17 and p. 34. 
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Although it might not be tightly legally binding, the Manual could be seen as extremely specific 
soft law or a technical norm that creates legal effects (budgetary decisions). This is especially 
the case when considering how Government Programmes have a strong legal effect in State 
budgeting. The Ministry of Finance also issues regulations125, but the Manual has not been 
labelled as one. Yet it seems to have legitimacy in budgetary affairs of the ministry level. 
Myllymäki thinks that the SBA and SBD do not provide a clear (legal) definition of what the 
State truly wants. He even inserts performance guidance as a concept into a combined 
dimension of politics, economics and law126. Ergo, this seems to be the point when the topic of 
the thesis starts to yet again venture outside fundamental legal sources and more into the world 
of auditing and evaluation. In spite of this, soft law and technical norms can be included in the 
category of acceptable or weakly obliging legal sources. 
The State Budget performance guidance is made out of three different elements: Effectiveness 
of operations, public impact and operational performance. Effectiveness is composed of public 
impact and operational performance127. According to effectiveness, Ministries shall plan and 
commit their operations in an effective manner i.e. as rationally as possible. For example, 
Meklin says that effectiveness simply means “doing things the right way”128. 
Public impact demands that public funds are used to achieve a positive outcome on the society 
in the long run. For example, a hospital is intended to cure diseases and help to populace in 
order to attain a better life. Operational performance states that Ministries shall use their 
resources as efficiently and economically as possible i.e. they shall produce more outputs with 
less inputs.129 
Figure 2 illustrates the aforementioned terms in the input-output model. The model is widely 
used to describe the components of any flow or process. Inputs are e.g. hospital staff, hospital 
equipment, government buildings, firefighters, public schooling etc. Outputs are the immediate 
results of the process like treated patients, firefighting missions and schooled adolescents. 
Outcomes are the long term results of the outputs e.g. a citizen that has been cured and is able 
to work again, a government building still working despite the risk of fire, and an educated 
                                                 
125 See eg. Ministry of Finance 2011: Regulation on Operational and Financial Planning and on the Compilation 
of Draft Spending Limits and Budgets. 
126 Myllymäki 2007 pp. 105–108. 
127 Idem p. 107. 
128 Meklin 2009 pp. 35–40. 
129 See e.g. Report of Finance Committee 30/2003 ps p. 3. 
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citizen working on behalf of the public. The main difference between outputs and outcomes is 
the time span.130 
EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATIONS 
Public Impact 
Operational Performance 
 
INPUT PROCESS OUTPUT OUTCOME 
ODA Flow 
Figure 2 Input-Output Model in Relation to Performance Guidance131 
Thus, public impact is the relation between inputs and outcomes while operational performance 
is the relation between inputs and outputs. When working effectively, ministries produce more 
outputs and outcomes of better quality with less input. This network forms the effectiveness of 
operations. 
The concepts of effectiveness, efficiency, input-output model etc. are a huge research field of 
their own right in auditing and evaluation132. A more detailed exploration of the 
aforementioned terms will be left out since the paper’s subject is first and foremost a legal one. 
But it is safe to say, that they do not by any means form a clear financial duty for the different 
entities of the State. 
The State Budget Act also requires that on-budget entities provide the Parliament and the public 
a true and fair view of their financial capabilities and appropriation usage: 
In their annual accounts and reports on operations compiled in order to implement accountability, 
government agencies shall provide true and fair information on their compliance with the budget, 
                                                 
130 See e.g. Myllymäki 2007 p. 135. 
131 Work of the author. See Ministry of Finance 2005 p. 59; McDavid – Huse – Hawthorn 2013 p. 19; Meklin 
2009 p. 36 and p. 46 for similar figures. 
132 See e.g. Meklin 2009 and McDavid – Huse – Hawthorn 2013 for more information. 
39 
 
their revenues and expenditure, their financial position and their operational performance (true 
and fair view). (SBA § 21(1).) 
The concept of true and fair view is an integral part of bookkeeping and thus of control. True 
view requires that the information is factually correct i.e. it does not contain essential mistakes. 
Fair view requires that the information covers the entity’s operational and financial data 
completely.133 The argument is quite rational: If the accounts of a state entity would not contain 
enough correct information, then the entity could not be truthfully and reasonably monitored. 
True and fair view is an accounting norm (see Accounting Act 1336/1997). In the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, it is the duty of the Financial Unit to record financial transactions and compile 
the budgetary year’s final accounts. One of the tasks of an audit is in all simplicity, to assess if 
there exists a reasonable assurance that the documents of the entity in question provide a true 
and fair view to the stakeholder134. In other words, if the stakeholder (in this case, the 
Parliament or the people) can trust the financial documentation and if the documentation truly 
gives us a glimpse of the entity’s financial capabilities135. 
The Financial Regulation of the EU136 does not have a direct effect on the State Budget since 
it only applies to EU budgeting (art. 1). Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to bring out the 
comparable EU definitions for operational performance (the principles of economy and 
efficiency combined) and effectiveness of operations (the principle of effectiveness) as they 
provide an extra legal source for the financial terms in question. These subprinciples together 
form the EUs principle of sound financial management: 
The principle of economy requires that the resources used by the institution in the pursuit of its 
activities shall be made available in due time, in appropriate quantity and quality and at the best 
price. 
The principle of efficiency concerns the best relationship between resources employed and results 
achieved. 
The principle of effectiveness concerns the attainment of the specific objectives set and the 
achievement of the intended results. (Article 30(2).) 
                                                 
133 GP 56/2013 ps p. 62. 
134 See e.g. National Audit Office of Finland 2010 p. 15. 
135 Financial Unit 2015 pp. 32–37. 
136 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on 
the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Un-ion and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 1605/2002. 
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Other norms in the State Budget Act that contribute to effective control include the obligations 
to arrange economic and secure cash management (§ 13), to uphold good bookkeeping practice 
(§ 15) and to arrange accounting of performance and other system in order to monitor operating 
costs and operative performance (§ 16). SBD chapter 8 lays out the provisions for preparing 
final accounts (activity report, budget outturn statement, income and expenditure statement, 
and appendix information) of the central government. 
3.2.2 The Development Cooperation Appropriation 
Next will be a short presentation of the development cooperation appropriation (ODA budget) 
in the current and following year as well as the 2010s based on State financing and OECD 
statistics. The displacement of several charts might be odd in a legal thesis, but the numbers 
are imperative for any controller, auditor or evaluator. It is next to impossible to discern the 
appropriate level of control if one does not know how much a certain item accounts to in 
relation to others. In order to direct control measures correctly, you need to know the figures. 
In addition, the appropriation forms the legal link with which Parliament and the Government 
enact their budgetary power. The appropriation in question is implemented in the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs according to its Financial Regulation137. 
As can be observed from table 3, Finland has not met its 0.7 % ODA/GNI target in the current 
decade and won’t meet it in 2015 or 2016138. The total appropriations and disbursements for 
development cooperation (including all ministries) has been around one billion euros for a 
while now. Please note that development cooperation infra includes all assistance sent under 
every ministry while the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is budgetary responsible for actual 
development cooperation, development cooperation loans and development cooperation 
financial investments appropriations. 
 
 
                                                 
137 See Financial Unit 2015 pp. 7–13. 
138 Finland reached the mark last time in 1991 with 0.75 % ODA/GNI. See Department of Development Policy 
28 September 2015 p. 2. Interestingly, this was during the Finnish recessions of the 1990s. See also Library of 
Congress 06 September 2015. 
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Table 3 Total Development Cooperation Funding (million €) 2010–2016139 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Appropriations 965.6 1 073.8 1 173.1 1 118.3 1 102.7 1 012.3 713.6 
Disbursements (ODA) 1 006.4 1 013.3 1 026.7 1 081.1 1 232.0 - - 
ODA / GNI 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.60 - - 
As was stated in Chapter 1.1, the Government plans to cut the development cooperation 
appropriation by approximately 200 million euros for the year 2016. Revenues from the 
Emissions Trading System will no longer be directed to development cooperation. 130 million 
euros will be transformed into loans and to the capital of FINNFUND140. This trend can be 
directly observed from the current Government Programme infra. 
The Government will take steps to improve effectiveness, productivity and measurability of 
development cooperation. In the longer term, the aim is to raise, in accordance with the UN goals, 
the level of Finland’s development cooperation contribution to 0.7% of gross national income, 
even though savings will be directed at development funding during the term of government.141 
The Development Policy Programme can be determined as a subprogramme of the Government 
Programme. Since the last Development Policy Programme is from 2012, a new one is 
currently being worked upon in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) based on the 
Government Programme in force and the SDGs. But for example in the Development Policy 
Programme 2012, it is stated that monitoring and reporting of development results at all levels 
will be strengthened by clear and measurable goals. Also, the internal control and external 
evaluations will be utilised systematically at the MFA.142 
The State Budget expenditures are categorized hierarchically into main divisions, chapters and 
items. Simply put, main divisions cover different ministries and sectors, chapters cover 
different activities and types (e.g. immigration, traffic infrastructure) and items cover different 
objectives and natures (e.g. refugee reception, icebreaker acquisitions). (SBA § 6, SBD §§ 4–
5.) Actual development cooperation (i.e. the development cooperation maintained by the MFA) 
is categorized as item 24.30.66. Loans are categorized as item 24.30.80 and FINNFUND as 
                                                 
139 Ministry of Finance [budjetti.vm.fi]: GP ps 30/2015: BP for the year 2016, main division 24, chapter 30 p. 2. 
140 Idem p. 1. 
141 Strategic Programme of Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Government 2015 p. 38. 
142 Development Policy Programme 2012 pp. 13–14, 21. 
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24.30.88. The amount of aid loan appropriations planned for the year 2016 is 40 million 
euros143. 
Below in table 4, the overall allocations of actual development cooperation (item 24.30.66) is 
displayed. These mostly correspond to the aforementioned OECD classifications of 
development cooperation. 
Table 4 Budget Allocation Table of Item 24.30.66 (million €) 2012–2016144 
 
Allocation 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1 Multilateral development cooperation 258.6 278.4 351.7 268.6 119.3 
2 
Country-specific and regional development 
cooperation 
240.6 247.3 290.0 234.4 148.0 
3 European Development Fund 42.4 47.1 47.8 25.2 45.0 
4 
Non-country specific development 
cooperation 
49.7 60.7 61.2 57.3 36.7 
5 Humanitarian assistance 84.4 96.4 105.7 74.8 70.0 
6 
Planning, support functions and 
communication of development cooperation 
8.7 10.6 8.0 8.0 5.0 
7 
Evaluation and internal audit of development 
cooperation 
2.1 2.2 1.9 2.7 2.3 
8 
Support to development cooperation 
conducted by civil society organisations 
95.0 105.1 109.9 114.0 65.0 
9 Concessional credits 7.4 14.2 15.1 16.5 6.8 
 
SUM 788.9 862.0 991.3 801.5 498.1 
In table 5, the multilateral development cooperation (allocation 24.30.66.1) has been divided 
into individual allocations as per section 9 of State Budget Act. The outcome of categorizing 
                                                 
143 Ministry of Finance [budjetti.vm.fi]: GP ps 30/2015: BP for the year 2016, main division 24, chapter 30 p. 8. 
144 Idem, p. 3; Department of Development Policy 28 September 2015 p. 2. 
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and dividing the budget is same as any other budget: To appropriately specify spending limits 
into separate sections and delegate the sections to relevant departments. 
Table 5 Allocation 24.30.66.1 Distribution Plan (1 000 € estimate) 2015145 
UN ORGANIZATIONS 116 370 
UN Development Programme (UNDP) 15 600 
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 20 000 
UN Population Fund 33 550 
UN Women 14 000 
Others 33 220 
WORLD BANK GROUP 94 958 
International Development Association 84 316 
Debt Relief Programs 7 792 
World Bank Group Partnership Programs 2 850 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 42 159 
African Development Bank and African Development Fund 36 309 
Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Fund 5 250 
Inter-American Development Bank capital raise 600 
OTHER MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS 13 783 
Global Environment Facility 4 325 
Others 9 458 
UNDIVIDED 1 298 
SUM 268 568 
                                                 
145 Ministry of Finance [budjetti.vm.fi]: Consolidated BP for the year 2015, main division 24, chapter 30, p. 5–6. 
Retrieved 28 September 2015. 
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FINNFUND is a state-owned company. Its primary objective is to promote the economic and 
social development of developing countries pursuant to section 2 paragraph 1 of the 
FINNFUND Act. According to the planned 2016 Budget Proposal, the ‘financial investments 
of development cooperation’ (item 24.30.89) appropriation is about to be de facto expanded by 
a 130 million (table 6). It will consist of a 130 million euro appropriation to FINNFUND and 
a 10 million appropriation to Inter-American Investment Corporation. 
Table 6 Item 24.30.89 Appropriations (€) 2013–2016146 
2016 Budget Proposal 140 000 000 
2015 Financial Statement 10 000 000 
2014 Financial Statement 10 000 000 
2013 Financial Statement 18 000 000 
According to State Budget Act section 8, the different items shall also include budget 
justifications. The justifications form a link between the effectiveness of the Ministry and the 
appropriations granted147. The justifications of BP 2016 for chapter 24.30 include inter alia 
that the Sustainable Development Goals will act as in important framework for the budget and 
that the budget will focus as per the Government Programme on e.g. the condition of girls and 
women, human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption work, reinforcement of developing nations 
tax bases, sustainable development including climate change, and progress of developing 
nations private sectors. Improving the measurability, performance and impact of development 
cooperation is a center of gravity for the budget.148 
Next in line are three charts compiled by the OECD. The purpose of tables 7, 8 and figure 9 is 
to show how OECD and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standards can be tied to 
national development cooperation budgeting. Table 7 specifically demonstrates how Finnish 
development cooperation channeled to countries (instead of regions or NGOs) is distributed 
according to the DAC type of aid classification. An overwhelming quantity of Finnish country-
specific aid is transferred to project-type interventions (69.2 %). 
                                                 
146 Ministry of Finance [budjetti.vm.fi]: GP ps 30/2015: BP for the year 2016, main division 24, chapter 30 p. 8 
and Ministry of Finance [budjetti.vm.fi]: BP for the year 2015, main division 24, chapter 30 p. 15. Note that item 
89 was de facto item 88 before 2016. 
147 Ministry of Finance 2005 p. 32. 
148 Ministry of Finance [budjetti.vm.fi]: GP ps 30/2015: BP for the year 2016, main division 24, chapter 30, p. 1. 
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Table 7 Composition of country programmed aid 2013149 
General budget support 7.6 % 
Sector budget support 6.2 % 
Core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes 0.0 % 
Contributions to  specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by INGOs 10.8 % 
Basket funds/pooled funding 4.6 % 
Project-type interventions 69.2 % 
Donor country personnel 0.2 % 
Other technical assistance 1.4 % 
Scholarships/training in donor country 0.0 % 
Grand Total 100.0 % 
 
Table 8 Bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector (million €) 2013150 
Sector 
Significant + 
principal 
objective 
Total sector 
allocable aid 
Gender equality 
focused aid 
    
Economic infrastructure 19.4 57.1 34 % 
Education 53.4 60.9 88 % 
Government and civil society 73.1 120.0 61 % 
Health 5.2 10.9 48 % 
Multisector 11.4 31.1 37 % 
Other social infrastructure 16.8 31.9 52 % 
Population and reproductive health 10.0 10.3 98 % 
Production 21.3 72.0 30 % 
Water and sanitation 11.2 29.7 38 % 
Table 8 on other other hand gives us the relation of DAC classifications marker and sector of 
destination in Finnish bilateral ODA in 2013. The funds marked as as a principal or a 
                                                 
149 OECD 2015 p. 203. StatLink [dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244323]. 
150 OECD 2015 p. 205. StatLink [dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244380]. USD currency transformed into euros with 
the rate of 04 October 2015: 1 USD = 0.892 EUR. 
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significant objective in promoting gender equality are displayed in relation to the total aid in 
the sector. It seems that in the policy objective of gender equality, Finland focuses its funding 
on the ‘Education’ (88 %) and ‘Population and reproductive health’ (98 %) sectors. Finland 
used in total 222 million euros of bilateral ODA to support gender equality in 2013. 
The top receiver of Finnish bilateral ODA was Tanzania with 26.3 million € in the 2012–2013 
average. The top 10 recipients accounted for 59 % of the bilateral ODA. As can be seen, most 
of Finnish bilateral aid was directed at Sub-Saharan Africa (34 %) in 2012–2013, while 34 % 
of bilateral ODA was unspecified by region. (Figure 3.) 
Figure 3 Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top 10 recipients (million €) 2012–2013151 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
MFA and the use of development cooperation appropriations is subject to the financial duties 
laid down in the Constitution, State Budget Act and State Budget Decree. The Ministry of 
Finance regulates the multiple different criteria (e.g. effectiveness, public impact) that are to 
be addressed in budgeting and budget use. The normative status of budgets, regulations and 
appropriations is not as clear as most other legislative instruments. Nevertheless, it can be 
agreed that the budget exerts a duty to fulfil the Parliament’s financial wishes. Thus, the MFA 
                                                 
151 OECD 2015 p. 204. StatLink [dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244355]. USD currency transformed into euros with 
the rate of 04 October 2015: 1 USD = 0.892 EUR. 
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must orchestrate development cooperation in accordance with the appropriation introduced 
here and use the funds in an operationally and strategically effective and impactful manner. In 
other words, MFA must plan for and attain results without wasting inputs or resources. The 
outputs, results and impacts should have a positive effect on the societies of developing states. 
The total development aid or ODA budget has been proposed by the Government as about 700 
million euros for the year 2016. Finland has not achieved the 0.7 % ODA/GNI target in the 
recent years and the chances of achieving it in the near future are slim. While actual 
development cooperation is decreased by approximately 200 million, there will be a 130 
million increase for FINNFUND and development aid investments. The appropriations are also 
distributed to numerous different projects which may present a controllability problem in terms 
of control resources (e.g. geographically-wise). I think it is safe to say that controlling one 
entity is always easier than controlling a number of entities. This and the complexity of the 
normative budgeting construct and the aforementioned vague criteria form a cloudy legal 
network and are issues that might not be the true intent of the legislature. While the 
appropriation does truly set certain limits for budget use, the performance guidance framework 
is somewhat indecisive and disconnected with e.g. EU budgeting. 
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4 Duty to Control 
4.1 Controlling State Funds 
4.1.1 Control as a Form of Responsibility and Accountability – ratio juris 
The last analysis chapter will detail the control of central government finances at both the state 
and the ministry level. Instead of parliamentary control and the wishes of the legislator, this 
chapter will burrow more deeply into organs and mechanisms contributing to actual control 
and answer two questions: 
1) Why are public funds controlled and 
2) how is control maintained according to norms? 
The objective of the private sector is to earn profit whereas the objective of public sector 
finances is to provide the society with services and infrastructure that it needs to function. 
Myllymäki specifically states that “public sector finances do not exist for public sector finances 
itself and the organizations managing it, but for the society and the citizens”.152 The public 
sector uses the funds gathered from citizens via fiscal policy and taxation with the authority of 
Parliament. In the end, Parliament is only a relay between the public sector and the citizens 
(Constitution § 2(1)153). Thus, the public sector is responsible and accountable to the public for 
its financial actions. This responsibility exists in different criteria according to GP 56/2003 ps: 
legal, political, performance, administrative, ethical and moral responsibilities. In general, 
responsibility means the duty of public sector financial management to report on its activities, 
to be evaluated according to the aforementioned criteria and to make conclusions based on the 
evaluations. Responsibility is embodied in accountability. Accountability means the duty of 
the administration to display a true and fair view of its finances in the form of annual activity 
reports, income and expenditure statements, balance sheets, reports on operations etc.154 
                                                 
152 Myllymäki 2007 pp. 23-24. Citation on p. 24. 
153 “The powers of the State in Finland are vested in the people, who are represented by the Parliament.” 
154 GP 56/2003 ps pp. 5–6. 
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This link between the public and the public sector is an integral part of audit theory as they 
construct a so called agent-principal relationship between them155: The public sector is an agent 
working for the public. Thus, the public sector is obliged to act in the best interest of the public. 
In order to ensure that the agent is using the principal’s funds efficiently and effectively, control 
is needed. The controller satisfies the need for the assurance that the agent is doing its job 
correctly.156 
Control is roughly divided into two categories organization-wise: Internal and external control. 
The terms are almost self-explanatory: Internal means control within the organization e.g. by 
the Evaluation Unit (EVA) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). Likewise, external 
means control from outside the organization. Consider for example the relationship between 
the National Audit Office (NAO) and the MFA.157 The scope and mission of internal control 
according to section 69, subsection 1 of the State Budget Decree (SBD) is displayed in full 
below: 
The agency management shall ensure that the proper procedure is followed by government 
agencies relative to the scope and content of their finances and operations and related risks 
(internal control) in order to ensure: 
1) the legality and results of the finances and operations of government agencies; 
2) the security of the funds and assets managed by government agencies; and 
3) the true and fair view of the finances and operations of government agencies required for each 
government agency’s management and external steering 
Bergmann defines internal control in a more compact form as follows: 
Internal control means any systems, measures or processes in order to ensure that public sector 
financial management operates in an efficient and effective manner, as well as in full compliance 
with any standards of laws.158 
Both definitions could be almost identical to external control with only minor modifications 
i.e. the mission of external control is to ensure that units follow legislation properly, manage 
funds effectively, provide a true and fair view of their finances etc. The viewpoint and whether 
                                                 
155 See e.g. Ittonen 2010 pp. 3-35 for more on audit theory and the agency theory. 
156 Myllymäki 2007 pp. 132–133. 
157 See e.g. Wacker 2011 pp. 246–247. 
158 Bergmann 2008 p. 115. 
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the unit of control is inside or outside the organization are the relevant differences between 
internal and external control. 
The State Budget Act or the State Budget Decree do not contain provisions concerning 
ministry-level internal control. Only the internal control of government agencies and public 
bodies has been stipulated as mandatory (e.g. SBA § 24b and SBD § 69(1)). According to 
Myllymäki, the internal control of ministries can be deduced from Government Rules of 
Procedure (GROP) chapter 3 and the accompanying Government orders159. For example, each 
ministry shall, within its mandate, consider operational and financial planning matters, matters 
concerning performance guidance, administrative matters, development and monitoring as 
stipulated in GROP section 11(2). Contra, in its recent effectiveness report concerning the 
guidance system of the MFA, the National Audit Office only referred to  SBA § 24b and SBD 
§ 69(1), even though they do not contain provisions that bind ministries160. Nevertheless, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Rules of Procedure (MFAROP) sections 3 and 4 organize internal 
control as a part of the Ministry. So even though there does not seem to be clear indication in 
Parliamentary legislation that ministries should organize internal control, it seems to be a de 
facto condition. The obligation to monitor financial activities could be with relative ease 
expanded and conducted with the aforementioned GROP section 11(2). 
In addition to the external-internal category, control can be divided by substance and 
temporally according to Myllymäki. As in the aforementioned SBD section 69(1), control has 
two separate substances to monitor: The control of legality and control of expediency. The 
function of control is to monitor that public sector finance management follows legislation, the 
budget, appropriations and other relevant norms, but in addition control monitors that the funds 
are spent appropriately, rationally and effectively. Temporally, control consists of monitoring 
and audits. Monitoring is constant while audits are performed on final accounts and reports ex 
post.161 Control before an asset is used (ex ante) is defined as appraisal in the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, but it could also be called e.g. decision-making control or pre-evaluation. 
                                                 
159 Myllymäki 2007 p. 149. 
160 NAO p. 68. 2013. 
161 Myllymäki 2007 p. 136. 
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4.1.2 Relevant Authorities and the Framework of Control 
As set by section 90(1) of the Constitution, Parliament supervises State finances and 
compliance with the State Budget and for this purpose, Parliament shall have an Audit 
Committee. The Audit Committee of Parliament was established on 1 June 2007 as one of the 
components controlling state funds. It was preceded by state auditors and a sub-committee of 
the Finance Committee. The control methods of the Audit Committee include inter alia hearing 
committees, inspections targets and requesting reports from the Government and appropriate 
ministers and.162 
Section 90(2) of the Constitution establishes the second control organ of the Constitution level: 
For the purpose of auditing State finances and compliance with the State budget, there shall be 
an independent National Audit Office (NAO) in connection with Parliament. NAO is the 
central agency in charge of controlling state finances, business-based public bodies and off-
budget funds. The mission of NAO is to audit the State's financial management and compliance 
with the budget and to monitor fiscal policy rules (Act on the NAO 676/2000 § 1(2)). NAO 
audits inter alia the final accounts of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs163. NAO was transferred 
in 2000 from the organization of the Ministry of Finance to act as an independent agency as a 
part of Parliament. Before the transfer, the independence of NAO was regarded as problematic 
since the Ministry of Finance was one of NAOs audit targets.164 The mission of NAO is an 
intrinsic value i.e. its purpose is to assure the Parliament, the administration and the public of 
the legality of budget use. It roots out ineffectiveness in the administration as well.165 
Myllymäki identifies three other organs in indirect control of the budget: The Chancellor of 
Justice of the Government (Constitution § 108), the Parliamentary Ombudsman (Constitution 
§ 109) and the public166. The duties of the Chancellor and the Ombudsman are mostly 
overlapping since it is the duty of both to ensure that the courts of law, the other authorities and 
the civil servants, public employees and other persons, when the latter are performing a public 
task, obey the law and fulfil their obligations. The Chancellor also oversees the lawfulness of 
the official acts of the Government and the President of the Republic. The public has access to 
                                                 
162 Wacker 2011 pp. 249–250. 
163 See e.g. National Audit Office of Finland 2015b for the audit of MFA’s budgetary year 2014. 
164 Myllymäki 2007 pp. 159–160; Wacker 2009 p. 42. 
165 Myllymäki 2007 pp. 167–168. NAO has audited MFA on different themes see e.g. references National Audit 
Office of Finland 2010 and 2013 (in Finnish). Abstracts can be found at the NAO website [www.vtv.fi/en]. 
166 Myllymäki 2007 p. 191. 
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budgeting and performance documents pursuant to the Act on Openness of Government 
Activities section 9(1) since they enter the public domain upon completion167. 
Broadly speaking, many other authorities and entities could be labelled as performing control 
on state finances e.g. the police, the Tax Administration, the EU, the European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF168) and the Financial Supervisory Authority. In addition to officials and the 
public in general, newspapers, the media and NGOs like Transparency International can be 
classified as exerting control over public funding. 
In the context of this thesis, a fairly important task rests upon the Government’s financial 
controller function attached to the Ministry of Finance. The purpose of the controller function 
is to ensure and develop the quality and financial accountability of the system used to control 
and report on central government finances and operations. The controller function inter alia 
co-ordinates, guides, develops and observes matters relevant to central government finances 
and operations as laid out in State Budget Act (SBA) section 24f. This duty equals to guiding 
and recommending the control framework that is to be used by administration officials. Section 
24f(1)(2) ties the controller directly to the subject at hand as it is laid out: 
It is the duty of the Government financial controller’s function to guide and co-ordinate, and to 
develop, State annual account reporting and other reporting and assessment concerning central 
government finances and performance, and the arrangement of internal control [--]. 
The Council for Internal Control and Risk Management is a prominent organ that works in 
conjunction with the controller function. It has numerous tasks of which the most relevant are 
listed infra: 
The task of the Council is [--] to agree on the procedures in internal control and in the 
administrative supervision of financial management with other authorities and government 
agencies, and to prepare the measures required therein; [--] (SBD § 71(2)(3)) 
to arrange for coordination of the internal auditing of government agencies and when necessary 
to harmonize the internal auditing activity of the government agency and the application of 
results; [--] (SBD § 71(2)(5)) 
The aforementioned provisions seem to grant a mandate for the controller function and the 
Council to organize the common internal control framework of State finances. This is 
                                                 
167 § 9(1): “Everyone shall have the right of access to an official document in the public domain.” Most budgetary 
documents cannot be declared secret pursuant to section 23 of the Act in question. 
168 From French, ‘Office européen de lutte antifraud”. 
53 
 
especially the case when the aforementioned information is combined with section 69a, 
subsection 1: 
The effects on the activity of government agencies of European Community law shall be taken 
into account in the internal control procedures. In addition, general standards and 
recommendations regarding internal control shall be taken into account. 
It should be noted at this point that the State Budget Decree is a decree proposed by the Ministry 
of Finance. Nevertheless, it seems that the general standards and recommendations regarding 
internal control are raised to a higher normative level pursuant to section 69a(1). Moreover, 
the controller function and the Council for Internal Control and Risk Management arrange these 
general standards and recommendations within the administration. 
In 2005 The Council issued a recommendation concerning internal control in State 
administration and which the controller function consolidated and circulated among the 
administration169. The recommendation contained a control framework for Finnish 
administrative use although its use was not deemed mandatory. The Finnish framework was 
based on the quasi-public Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework (ERM).  The 
framework displayed infra encompasses the aspects that a functioning internal control should 
examine and address: 
the agency’s operating environment; 
setting of objectives; 
identification, evaluation and management of risks; 
controls (control measures); 
communication and flow of information; 
and monitoring of internal control and risk management performance. 
A more compact form of the framework was issued in 2009 In addition to the recommended 
control framework, other general frameworks can be utilized according to the controller 
function170. One of these include the aforementioned ERM that was crafted by the US 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) and its 
composition can be seen in table 9. The Finnish recommendation and the ERM are almost 
                                                 
169 See Government Financial Controller Function 2005. 
170 Ibidem. 
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identical and since the ERM contains data in a more compact and clear form on individual 
components, it will be displayed here. 
Table 9 Components of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)171 
Internal 
Environment 
The internal environment encompasses the tone of an organization, and 
sets the basis for how risk is viewed and addressed by an entity’s people, 
including risk management philosophy and risk appetite, integrity and 
ethical values, and the environment in which they operate. 
Objective Setting 
Objectives must exist before management can identify potential events 
affecting their achievement. Enterprise risk management ensures that 
management has in place a process to set objectives and that the chosen 
objectives support and align with the entity’s mission and are consistent 
with its risk appetite. 
Event Identification 
Internal and external events affecting achievement of an entity’s 
objectives must be identified, distinguishing between risks and 
opportunities. Opportunities are channeled back to management’s strategy 
or objective-setting processes. 
Risk Assessment 
Risks are analyzed, considering likelihood and impact, as a basis for 
determining how they should be managed. Risks are assessed on an 
inherent and a residual basis. 
Risk Response 
Management selects risk responses – avoiding, accepting, reducing, or 
sharing risk – developing a set of actions to align risks with the entity’s 
risk tolerances and risk appetite. 
Control Activities Policies and procedures are established and implemented to help ensure 
the risk responses are effectively carried out. 
Information and 
Communication 
Relevant information is identified, captured, and communicated in a form 
and timeframe that enable people to carry out their responsibilities. 
Effective communication also occurs in a broader sense, flowing down, 
across, and up the entity. 
Monitoring 
The entirety of enterprise risk management is monitored and 
modifications made as necessary. Monitoring is accomplished through 
ongoing management activities, separate evaluations, or both. 
As can be seen from the ERM components, internal control is seen more as a form of risk 
control in auditing and evaluation. If there is a risk of accidents, abuse, loss of assets etc. control 
is to detect it and reduce the possibility of risk realization. Thus, these control frameworks 
                                                 
171 COSO 2004 pp. 3–4. 
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address more phenomena than simply poorly decided development aid funding. In addition the 
framework displays the multitude of tasks control consists of de facto. 
ERM and another framework developed by COSO, the Internal Control framework172, secured 
their place in the world of control thanks to the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002173. The 
Act enforced publicly listed commercial corporations to follow a strict set of financial 
reporting, independence of auditors, corporate governance etc. provisions. Although intended 
for the private sector, the SOX has become applicable to the non-profit and public sector as 
well. Bergmann stated in 2008 that there is no international equivalent law or standard to the 
SOX.174 
Interestingly, the Internal Control framework of COSO is not seemingly used at all in Finnish 
State financial management. But as COSO itself reminds us, the ERM and the Internal Control 
frameworks share overlapping components and that they are meant as complementary to each 
other175. The International Standard Organization (ISO) has also engineered a relevant 
framework in 2009, the risk management framework ISO 31000. The ISO 31000 is intended 
to harmonize risk management across all entities (public, private or community enterprise, 
association, group or individual) and to be used as a uniform tool to analyse risk.176 There has 
been some debate if the ISO 31000 should be implemented into Finnish public sector financial 
management. 
The National Audit Office (NAO) complies with the International Standards of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (ISSAI) of the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(INTOSAI)177. The INTOSAI standards as well as the International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing developed by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
shall be omitted. There simply is not enough time and space to display even a shallow surface 
of all the recommendations and standards at hand. But it should be noted that the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Budget is spearheading the EU-wide Public Internal 
Financial Control (PIFC) model for Member State use. The objective of PIFC is to “implement 
sound financial management as an integral part of good governance relating to the management 
                                                 
172 COSO 2013. 
173 Act to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to 
the securities laws, and for other purposes. 
174 Bergmann 2008 pp. 118, 121–122. 
175 COSO 2013 p. ii. 
176 International Organization for Standardization 2009. 
177 National Audit Office of Finland 2015a p. 7; INTOSAI 04 October 2015. 
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and control of the national budgetary funds”.178 The PIFC is a part of harmonization process 
and can also be tied to the Financial Regulation of the EU and specifically to its Article 30. 
If performance guidance seemed complicated and vague, then control frameworks are even 
more obscure. The science of auditing and evaluation contains more similar frameworks that 
are researched extensively. The jump from the State Budget Act and State Budget Decree to 
control frameworks and standards is a notable one since it most definitely marks the border 
between hard law and soft law. The control frameworks and standards are more akin to 
professional principles than to Parliamentary legislation. As a testament to the obscurity of 
control definitions, the Government of Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen stated the following: 
There is no single, universally adopted, approach to risk management in development 
cooperation. Finland, for its part, aims to advance the harmonisation of risk management 
practices within the international organisations to which we belong; a broad consensus prevails 
among the donor community regarding the benefits of harmonisation.179 
4.2 Control in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
4.2.1 Deciding Upon Development Cooperation Funding 
Interestingly, there is no general parliamentary law for development cooperation or for its 
funding. Most of the statutes concerning aid have been showcased here, but there are two 
additional parliamentary acts concerning side details of the issue at hand. First, the participation 
of state agencies and public bodies in development cooperation has been sanctioned by 
Parliament. The state agencies and public bodies are to do so in tight collaboration with the 
MFA. The funds for the operations are activated from the MFA’s development cooperation 
budget (chapter 24.30).180 Second, Parliament has enacted the Act on Concessional Credits 
                                                 
178 European Commission 2012 p. 5; Bergmann 2008 pp. 124–125. 
179 Government Report on the Impact and Coherence of Development Policy 2014 p. 38. 
180 See Act Concerning the Participation of State Agencies and Public Bodies in Development Cooperation 
382/1989 and Decree Concerning the Participation of State Agencies and Public Bodies in Development 
Cooperation 383/1989. 
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Granted to Developing States 1114/2000181. According to sections 3 and 5 of the Act, 
concessional credits can only be granted to states authorized by the OECD and that the MFA 
should follow OECD principles when monitoring concessional credit usage. This is seemingly 
the only place in parliamentary law where OECD is coupled so tightly with Finnish 
development cooperation. OECD and the US Library of Congress have also noted the lack of 
development cooperation legislation in Finland182. For example, Belgium, Canada and 
Denmark have enacted general acts on the use of development cooperation183. 
The decision process of actually funding a certain aid project, program etc. is made at the MFA 
(appraisal analysis). The appraisal analysis is a tool for decision-maker to guide him in 
selecting a feasible and sustainable funding. Simply put, in appraisal analysis different criteria 
will be selected in relation to the goal of the action, the desired performance and other 
information the decision-maker requires. The criteria will be assessed from multiple viewpoints 
(effects, weight, sensitivity etc.) and alternative methods will be dropped in the favour of a 
more sustainable one.184 Project appraisal is a subject of its own and it will not be explored in 
detail here. Nevertheless, appraisal analysis and the decision process is a form of ex ante control 
as the use of the funds are controlled even before funds are actually transferred. Myllymäki 
refers to this sort of processual control as administrative control185. 
From a legal-technical view the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Rules of Procedure (MFAROP, 
550/2008) is a decree of the MFA and thus its place in legal hierarchy is considerably lower 
than a parliamentary set act or a government decree. MFAROP section 8(1) sets out that 
operations of the Ministry are performance guided. According to paragraph 2 of the same 
section, the Secretary of State is in overall charge of the Ministry’s performance guidance with 
Director-Generals and Directors under his supervision. Paragraphs 3 and 4 lay out that that the 
operational units of the Ministry are accountable for accomplishing their goals, controlling 
their risks, effectiveness of operations and internal control. 
According to section 18 of the MFAROP, the Ministry’s operational units are divided into 
departments. Departments are subdivided into units pursuant to §§ 19–29. The Department of 
                                                 
181 Act 1114/2000 repealed the former equivalent Act 1058/1986 on 01 January 2001. 
182 See OECD 2010a p.128; Library of Congress 06 September 2015. 
183 OECD 2010a pp. 116, 119, 122. Germany, Norway and Sweden on the other hand do not have foreign aid 
legislation, see pp. 134, 158, 167. 
184 See more e.g. Van Pelt, Michiel J.F. – Kuyvenhoven, Arie – Nijkamp, Peter 1990 pp. 145–151. There are 
multiple different frameworks for project appraisal like the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and multi-criteria analysis 
(MCA). 
185 Myllymäki 2007 p. 129. 
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Development Policy consists of eight different units e.g. Unit for Sectoral Policy, Unit for 
International Environmental Policy and Unit for UN Development Issues (§ 21186). Section 2 
states that each department has its own rules of procedure and that units may have one. The 
departments and units of the MFA are abbreviated with a three letter code that roughly 
corresponds to the Finnish name of the operational unit. Therefore the Department for 
Development Policy is abbreviated KEO. Some of the duties and tasks of KEO as laid out in 
section 33 are: 
Finland's international development policy, development cooperation policy, and development 
and humanitarian financing; 
overall planning and monitoring of development cooperation, action plans and financial planning, 
budget formulation, financial administration as well as statistics and reporting; 
quality control, development and guidance related to development cooperation, including 
development research; 
development policy and development cooperation in the EU and the OECD; 
FINNFUND, concessional credits and business-to-business partnerships; 
development questions in the UN, and the UN's operative development programmes and funds; 
sustainable development and international environmental policy, including related financing; 
humanitarian aid policy and humanitarian assistance; 
The two other operational units central to this thesis are the Unit for Internal Audit and the 
Development Evaluation Unit187. They are abbreviated STY-00 and EVA-11, respectively. The 
other units are also internally abbreviated with a two digit code (10, 02 etc.). 
By the virtue of chapter 6 of the MFAROP, issues are prepared with a normal ‘presentation by 
a presenting officer’ method in the appropriate operational unit. The powers of decision are 
provided in chapter 7 and development cooperation issues are specifically decided pursuant to 
sections 89–91. First off, the Minister decides upon distributing the actual development 
cooperation appropriations unto performance areas and the use of appropriations unless 
otherwise provided. The Director-General of KEO can decide on actual development 
cooperation appropriation use till 500 000 euros unless it will be used for a private association 
or foundation or concerns humanitarian assistance, assistance to Finnish universities or 
universities of applied science, appropriations handled by STY-00 or other significant public 
                                                 
186 The duties and tasks of the individual units are laid out in the KEO Rules of Procedure, see HEL7M0621-11. 
187 Interestingly, EVA-11 is called Development Evaluation Unit on the MFA’s website, but for instance on the 
Evaluation Manual EVA-11 is called the Evaluation Office. 
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issue. The Director of the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance decides on the funding of an urgent 
and large-scale humanitarian response to a crisis. 
The Minister, the Director-General or the Director can delegate the more detailed distribution 
of appropriations inside a project or a programme to a presenting officer. Roving Ambassadors 
decide upon appropriation usage in local projects and subsequent contracts in their sector. 
Director-General of the appropriate department decides on development cooperation with 
foreign states, international organizations and international financial institutions, on the aid 
given to the aforementioned organs and on the recovery of assets. Unit Directors decide upon 
appropriation timetable changes, changes of funding (e.g. return, cancellation), unused project 
appropriations and other issues that the Director-General does not decide on. The Director-
General and Directors can delegate the signing of agreements to public servants. The public 
servants of the appropriate department decide upon details that were not already decided higher 
up the chain-of-command e.g. planning, implementation and control of development 
cooperation, and subsequent contracts, assignments and other commitments. (§ 89–91.) For 
example, in KEO, Directors decide on the internal work assignments of public servants188. 
For example, in the implementation of the 2015 budget, the actual development cooperation 
appropriation189 was issued to KEO190. Minister for International Development Sirpa Paatero 
assigned the appropriation further to different performance areas on 4 February 2015191. For 
example, the multilateral development cooperation appropriation192 was delegated to three 
different departments: Political Department (POL), Department for External Economic 
Relations (TUO) and the Department for Development Policy (KEO)193. Country-specific and 
regional development assistance194 is predominantly handled by the regional departments e.g. 
Department for the Americas and Asia (ASA) and their missions abroad195. The 
implementation document also stressed that the appropriation assignments are binding for the 
departments, services and embassies196. 
                                                 
188 HEL7M0621-11 § 14(2). 
189 Item 24.30.66, 801 500 000 euros in 2015, see table 4. 
190 HEL7M0394-9 p. 32. 
191 HEL7W0060-1, see table 10 (Appendix 1). 
192 Allocation 24.30.66.1, 268 600 000 euros in 2015, see table 4. 
193 KEO was issued 264 159 682 euros, POL 610 000 euros and TUO 2 500 000 euros, see table 10 (Appendix 1). 
194 Allocation 24.30.66.2, 234 400 000 euros in 2015, see table 4. 
195 HEL7W0060-1, see table 10 (Appendix 1). 
196 HEL7M0394-9 pp. 24–25. 
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MFA has three distinct supervisory groups that have an ex ante control function in the MFA: 
According to section 12 of MFAROP, operational units have a Management Group197 that 
supports the Director-General and prepares the most significant departmental issues and other 
issues ordered by the Director-General. The Development Policy Steering Group is set in 
motion by section 13. The Steering Group prepares strategical advice on development policy 
goals, resource distribution and on the evaluation and development of results and effectiveness. 
Pursuant to section 14, the MFA will have a Development Policy Quality Group that processes 
funding decisions prepared by KEO in accordance with section 90 before they are finalized. 
The Quality Group does not process e.g. pre-targeted appropriations, humanitarian assistance 
or projects decided by the Minister. 
Outside the MFA’s Rules of Procedure, there exists the Development Policy Commission. The 
Commission is a political advisory body that reviews development policy matters and assesses 
the quality and effectiveness development cooperation appropriations. The Commission is set 
by Government Decision for a term, but it has no legal foundation outside the Decision. It 
consists of several members (e.g. Members of Parliament, NGO representatives, 
researchers).198 
4.2.2 Dedicated Control of the ODA Flow 
Internal control and internal auditing of the MFA have been laid out in sections 3 and 4 of 
MFAROP. The objective of internal control is fairly equivalent with section 69 of the State 
Budget Decree. The main responsibility of organizing the management, steering, monitoring 
and reporting actions related to internal control has been delegated to appropriate departments 
and the public servants in question. In addition to MFAROP, the MFA’s internal Financial 
Regulation sets out that internal control should adhere to State directives and recommendations 
and that directors of operational units are in charge of the general implementation of internal 
control199. 
                                                 
197 The MFA organization includes a Management Group of the Ministry and an Extended Management Group 
of the Ministry as well (MFRAROP §§ 9–10). 
198 See [www.kehityspoliittinentoimikunta.fi]. 
199 Financial Unit 2015 p. 6. 
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Thus, internal control of development cooperation is first and foremost up to the department in 
charge of the partial ODA flow, whereas the Unit for Internal Audit (STY-00) as an 
operationally independent organ ensures the level of internal control and the Development 
Evaluation Unit (EVA-11) coordinates evaluations. The duties of STY-00 and EVA-11 are set 
out in sections 44 and 44a of MFAROP, respectively. The MFA Financial Regulation adds that 
it is the duty of every MFA public servant to report their findings in the event of a suspected 
inappropriate or risky procedure, dereliction, abuse or crime200. The report is then to be relayed 
to the relevant units (e.g. Unit for Internal Audit, National Audit Office, police).201 The 
Financial Regulation outlines the implementation of the budget and bookkeeping in the MFA 
as well202. 
According to the Unit for Internal Audit (STY-00) Rules of Procedure203 section 2, STY-00 
provides the leadership of MFA with information on the appropriateness and adequacy of risk 
management and internal control in the Ministry, the missions and on development 
cooperation. Internal auditing is divided into audit of operations and audit of finances (§§ 5 
and 6 respectively). Audit of operations can include auditing individual departments, units, 
missions, a development cooperation implementation organisation or a specific theme. STY-
00 plans the audits of operations and the plans are accepted by the Secretary of State. STY-00 
produces reports on its audits of operations. Unlike EVA-11, STY-00 does not publish its 
findings on the MFA website proactively although auditing reports most likely are 
predominantly open to the public. The audit of finances focuses on inspecting the expediency 
and legality of appropriation use, and on preparing background memos for audit of operations 
in the missions of the MFA. The audit of finances can be performed on the MFA itself, 
departments, units and development cooperation issues as well. The final task of STY-00 is to 
handle reports of abuse pursuant to section 7 of the STY-00 Rules of Procedure. 
The internal regulation Evaluation of Development Cooperation Norm204 details the evaluation 
of development cooperation. The objective of evaluation is to act as a component of MFA’s 
accountability and to determine the value of a project or programme in relation to its goals 
pursuant to section 1 of the Norm. Evaluation is defined as an independent ex ante, mid-term 
or ex post procedure that is conducted according to OECDs Development Assistance 
                                                 
200 This situation was realized in the Costa Rica-Instrumentarium case, see 2400/R/151/07. 
201 Financial Unit 2015 pp. 38–39. 
202 Idem pp. 32–37. 
203 HEL7099-2. 
204 HEL7M0512-1. 
62 
 
Committee (DAC) specifications205. Yet again we can see that OECD standards and definitions 
play a part in many aspects of development cooperation. The MFA’s Evaluation Manual points 
out that MFA uses standards formulated by the EU and UN Evaluation Group (UNEG)206. The 
Evaluation Manual also outlines the de facto processes and actions of evaluation. 
According to sections 2 and 3 of the Norm, centralized evaluation is carried out by the 
Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11)207 and focuses on strategically significant and large-
scale matters. In the context of centralized evaluation, EVA-11 is responsible for e.g. 
conducting evaluations concerning the financial instruments, pivotal policy alignments, 
process, country programmes and partner organisations.  Decentralized evaluation is 
conducted by the appropriate department or mission on a specific project basis and focuses on 
e.g. appraisal, mid-term and final evaluation. As per the decentralized evaluation doctrine, 
individual departments and missions are responsible for the ex ante (appraisal), midterm, final 
and ex post evaluations of their own projects. EVA-11 coordinates both centralized and 
decentralized evaluation planning on a two year schedule together with the Development 
Policy Steering Group (§ 4). 
Evaluations are conducted by professionals independent of the MFA and the results of the 
evaluation are always to be reacted upon as stipulated in sections 5 and 6. For example, the 
latest tender notice is for a final review of the Energy and Environment Partnership Programme 
with Indonesia, a project that has been running since 2002. The total budget of the Department 
for the Americas and Asia (ASA) administrated project is 4.108 million euros and the budget 
for the evaluation is 80 000 euros.208 The tendering of independent evaluations is subject to the 
Act on Public Contracts 348/2007. 
Control is performed predominantly by general public servants and by specialists according to 
administrative orders. Auditors audit the bookkeeping, final accounts and other reports of the 
entity after the budgetary year. Public sector auditors typically are qualified as chartered public 
finance auditors (CPFA) and they are to meet the prerequisites set in Act on Chartered Public 
                                                 
205 See DAC 2010. The DAC standards for evaluation are created based on the High Fora of Aid Effectiveness 
e.g. the Paris Declaration. 
206 Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013 pp. 5, 40. 
207 Evaluation reports produced by EVA-11 can be viewed at 
[formin.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=49728&contentlan=2&culture=en-US]. 
208 UH2015-009739. Tender notices can be viewed in the Ministry of Finance online service Hilma. For the 
aforementioned tender notice, see [www.hankintailmoitukset.fi/fi/notice/view/2015-023512/]. 
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Finance Auditors 467/1999209. Auditing in general is subject to Auditing Act 459/2007210. 
Internal auditors may possess a Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) issued by the non-
governmental Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)211. As Myllymäki puts it, “good auditing 
practice [Auditing Act § 22] is an empty provision without the institutions and the people who 
shape said practice”212. 
The openness of development aid documents and the ability to report infringements also 
contribute to overall control. Official documents prepared by MFA in the framework of 
development cooperation are mainly in the public domain and thus everyone has a right to 
access them. It is the duty of authorities to produce and disseminate e.g. guides, statistics and 
publications on their matters as well.213 The different development cooperation projects and 
various other publications can be openly viewed on the MFA web site214. This notion of 
openness is emphasized e.g. in the Evaluation of Development Cooperation Norm sections 4 
and 7. The MFA set up an electronic system for reporting alleged misuse of Finland’s 
development cooperation funds in May 2014215. 
The Parliamentary Finance Committee stressed in its report on the 2015 Budget that control is 
a substantive part of development cooperation and it serves the purpose of responsibility. The 
Committee was concerned that aid is still being transferred to numerous small entities instead 
of sizeable targets. With more uniform targeting, the effectiveness of funding use could be 
improved.216 
On 6 May 2015, MFA released a meta-evaluation of project and programme evaluations 
between 2012 and 2014 conducted by Universalia Management Group Ltd. One of the 
conclusions of the meta-evaluation was that “[o]verall, the quality of Finland’s development 
co-operation was rated most positively in terms of the relevance and effectiveness of evaluated 
projects and least positively in relation to their efficiency and sustainability of results217”. But 
                                                 
209 The Act on Chartered Public Finance Auditors will be repealed by the new equivalent Act 1142/2015 on 01 
January 2015. 
210 The Auditing Act will be repealed by the new equivalent Act 1141/2015 on 01 January 2015. 
211 See [na.theiia.org]. 
212 Myllymäki 2007 p. 185. 
213 Act on the Openness of Government Activities 621/1999 §§ 5, 6, 9, 19, 20, 22 §. 
214 [formin.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=48019&contentlan=2&culture=en-US] 
215 [vaarinkaytosilmoitus.fi/#/?lang=en] 
216 Report of Finance Committee 37/2014 ps p. 15. 
217 Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2015 p. 76. 
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on the other hand, the meta-evaluation noted that risk assessment (i.e. control) was graded as 
poor: 
Risk management was lacking in many projects. Risks were often not taken into account during 
the design phase, and risk assessments were not always complete or accurate. Where mitigating 
strategies were not in evidence, emerging risks contributed to delays in implementation, and in 
some cases became a barrier to projects achieving their intended project objectives.218 
The dedicated control at the MFA thus consists of three levels: 1) decentralized and inherent 
control at the departments and units responsible for the funding decisions augmented by the 
Development Policy Quality Group, 2) centralized and evaluative control at EVA-11 
augmented by the Development Policy Steering Group and 3) upkeep of control by STY-11. 
The temporal limits of each level are not set in stone. The departments and units perform ex 
ante control of projects, but they also have to monitor project progress and the eventual 
outcome. Concurrently, EVA-11 can issue appraisal evaluations, mid-term evaluations as well 
as ex post evaluations. The same rules apply to STY-11. Interestingly, none of the regulations 
and documents showcased here mention the ERM or any other control framework. The 
Evaluation Norm contains references to DAC, EU and UNEG standards. 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
Public funds are controlled because the funds are amassed from the public. The objective of 
control is to monitor and assure that public entities operate effectively and according to 
legislation i.e. that the funds are used responsibly and accountably. Control can be external or 
internal organisation-wise and temporally it can be performed ex ante, constantly during the 
process and ex post. All modes of control are exerted by numerous different entities in the State 
and Ministry for Foreign Affairs e.g.  Audit Committee, NAO, financial controller function, 
STY-00, EVA-11 and different departments. 
Control is supported by frameworks. The financial controller function has set forth the 
recommendation of an internal control framework in the State based upon the ERM. Like 
performance guidance of the State budgeting, control frameworks seem like overtly 
complicated tools. These frameworks are not utilised by the MFA even though it is the wish of 
                                                 
218 Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2015 p. 77. 
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the Government that control and risk management should be harmonised. I do not suggest that 
ERM or the current frameworks are the best options, but there is a clear disparity in control 
methods between different State entities. 
Duty to follow performance guidance (MFAROP § 8) 
Financial Regulation, HEL7M0394-9, HEL7M0512-1, HEL7099-2, HEL7W0060-1 
APPRAISAL                        MONITORING                        EVALUATION 
Minister 
STY-00, appropriate departments, EVA-11 
Development Policy Quality Group  Development Policy Steering Group 
EX ANTE INCEPTION MID-TERM FINAL EX POST 
time of project or program 
Figure 4 Control Regulations, Forms, Entities and Phases in the MFA219 
The different components of control at the MFA are displayed in figure 4 supra. The 
implementation of appropriations are set by the Minister to different performance areas and 
subsequently to the authority of Director-Generals, Directors and public servants in the internal 
budget and internal regulations (e.g. the implementation document and Financial Regulation) 
according to the MFAROP. Thus, the development cooperation appropriation laid out by 
Parliament is relayed to individual public servants through a public chain of command. 
                                                 
219 Based partly on figure 4 of the Evaluation Manual, see Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013 p. 37. 
66 
 
5 Thesis Summary and Discussion – The 2030 Agenda 
Only time will tell in which way the new SDGs and the renewed motivation to transfer aid will 
take development cooperation. The trend so far seems to be that more effective, more 
controlled, more transparent and more responsible development cooperation is called upon. 
And the political or soft legal pledge of the United Nations and its Member States to end 
poverty, end hunger, achieve gender equality, ensure access to energy etc. will most likely not 
disappear or be rendered vain in the nearby future. Ergo, Finland will have to follow through 
just like other nations and keep on transferring aid. 
The outline of the results and the accumulated answer to the research question220 can be found 
in figure 5. The relevant norms are set in a somewhat hierarchical position in which the UN 
General Assembly resolutions stand as the most binding of norms while the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs internal norms serve the less binding. This seems counterintuitive from a legal 
viewpoint and from what was discussed during the paper. Yet when reviewed from politico-
legal or legal-economic standpoints, then UN is de facto the legal tinder and the source of all 
the subsequent legislature concerning development cooperation. The EU, OECD and Republic 
of Finland follow UN resolutions even though they are “only” recommendations. 
After dropping down from the Constitution level into State budgeting enactments, the mischief 
begins. The State Budget Act and Decree start forming an elusive and ornate web of duties, 
obligations and definitions called the performance guidance that are difficult to decipher and 
to wield. Critique of performance guidance is heard in both the State administration and the 
academic world. To understand the logic behind these important norms, you require a 125 page 
Manual of Performance Guidance that was published over ten years ago. This hardly seems 
rational, coherent and predictable law-making when in auditing and evaluation science 
performance guidance can be illustrated with a mere flowchart (the Input-Output model). This 
grand performance rationale was even described in one simple sentence by Meklin: “Doing 
things the right way221”. 
 
 
                                                 
220 “What are the relevant legal norms concerning the control of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland’s 
development cooperation appropriations at the state and ministry levels?” 
221 Supra note 128. 
67 
 
UNGA resolutions 
Millennium Development Goals, Sustainable Development Goals, 0.7 % ODA/GNI 
European Union Law 
“The Union and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the 
objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent 
international organisations.” 
The Constitution of Finland 
“Finland participates in international co-operation for the protection of peace and human rights and 
for the development of society.” 
Budgetary Principles 
Government Act & Government Rules of Procedure 
delegates the matter of development cooperation to the MFA 
OECD 
ODA & classifications (recipient, channel of delivery, type of aid, sector of destination, marker) 
DAC principles, criteria and standards 
State Budget Act, State Budget Decree 
budgetary power of Parliament, appropriation, financial duties, performance guidance 
Ministry of Finance 
operational and financial planning, effectiveness of operations, public impact 
Development Cooperation Appropriation (Chapter 24.30) 
items, justifications, distribution, allocations 
Control – ratio juris 
responsibility and accountability, control of legality, control of expediency 
Authorities of External Control 
Audit Committee, NAO, Parliamentary Ombudsman, Chancellor of Justice etc. 
State Control Framework 
the recommended framework of the financial controller function and COSO-ERM 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
Ministry Rules of Procedure, budget implementation 
operational unit Rules of Procedures, Evaluation Norm, internal budget 
Figure 5 Systematization of Development Cooperation Control in Finland 
We then turned our eye into actual control. According to the thesis, the legal system of 
development cooperation control is fragmented and shrouded in layers that do not fit together. 
When hard law begins turning into soft law, the coherency of legislation also declines. Definite 
bridges of law are few and far between. Multiple different organs operate on the same turf and 
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they employ different frameworks and guidance. At the same time, it is the wish of the 
legislator and the executive to harmonize control and risk management in a uniform fashion. 
For example, it is the duty of the Government’s financial controller function to supervise and 
organize the arrangement of internal control. Yet the regulations of the MFA do not refer to 
the financial controller function’s recommendations in any way. On the other hand, 
Development Evaluation Unit is obligated by internal regulations to follow OECD standards 
in its evaluative work. 
Thus, harmonization and uniformity is not impossible. But apparently no entity has had the 
will to enforce the frameworks of control under their command. So far most of the control 
legislation seems to be on the softer side of soft law i.e. recommendations and standards. Only 
OECD seems to have such a credibility that their standards are followed to the letter. The 
problem and risk with fragmenting law and a bundle of frameworks spiralling out of control is 
that the true power of legislation and budgeting might not stay in the hands of the legislator 
and the people. If the money of the people is transferred abroad and used on foreign soil, then 
the people should decide how its use is controlled. The problem of ‘control adrift’ can be 
returned straight to the Constitution of Finland section 2(1): The powers of the State in Finland 
are vested in the people, who are represented by the Parliament. Some of the empirical politico-
economic notions222 and the large geographical and sectoral dispersion of foreign aid funding 
support the observation that control is not at its optimal level. 
I was also forced to duel with the normative-theoretical border of hard law and soft law. Even 
though this kind of research was not the planned direction, the binding tier of legal sources 
could not be just left aside. Thus, it is impossible to say at what point does formal binding law 
stops and soft law starts just on the strength of this paper. For example, does performance 
guidance exert a true duty to the public sector or is it just fancy word play? Chinkin was quoted 
saying that soft law should “contain vague and imprecise terms223”. With this in mind, 
performance guidance and control frameworks definitely belong to soft law. 
Personally, the thesis was a leap of faith into the unknown. I knew that State assets are 
controlled and that there would be legal links to ascertain the nature of this control. But I did 
not know how deep I would have to dig in order to find the correct chain of provisions. For 
example, at an early point in the thesis I held an idea of incorporating the prevention of 
                                                 
222 Supra notes 216–218. 
223 Supra note 40. 
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corruption into the theme of control as well. This idea had to be scrapped immediately when it 
became clear that the subject at hand was far larger than was envisioned. 
Nonetheless, in the view of the author, the research plan was carried out. The legal nature of 
controlling development cooperation in Finland was mapped out even though the cartography 
might not be as concrete in some places as would be optimal. But this only serves as reminder 
of the main objective of a thesis: The objective to school the author in scientific research. Every 
failure of this thesis has ricocheted as new knowledge and wisdom. Another personal goal was 
to mature up and start interpreting statutes more on my own rather than relying purely on past 
research. A thesis should connect with contemporary research regarding its field, but in the end 
these are just interpretations of law by humans (that tend to err). 
The subject of the paper could be expanded into multiple directions in future studies. Each of 
the analysis chapters encompass a specific set that could form a dissertation with deeper 
exploration. For example, the international law connections in development cooperation 
between the UN, EU and OECD or the more detailed study of MFA’s control measures would 
serve a fruitful base for possible future research. The normative aspects of development 
cooperation law (or law of ODA, as Philip Dann puts it) and especially the boundary of soft 
law and hard law is in a clear need of definition in relation to Finnish jurisdiction. A more 
empirical or interdisciplinary approach of this paper’s subject might additionally be beneficial 
e.g. research of development cooperation norms with economical tools. The SDGs224 and the 
ever growing pressure on the public economy will be provide an ample amount of new material 
to explore for years to come.
                                                 
224 UNGA Resolution 70/1: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
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6 Appendix 1 
Table 10 Internal Budget of Item 24.30.66 (€) 2015225 
Allocation Internal Budget 4.2.2015 
Appropriation 
2015 
Deferred from 
2014 
Deferred from 
2013 
Appropriation 
sum 
24.30.66  Actual development cooperation 797,622,000 275,909,714 114,589,135 1,188,120,849 
24.30.66.1 Multilateral development cooperation 268,568,513 55,857,397 15,269,381 339,695,292 
  DEPARTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 264,159,682 55,678,110 15,114,301 334,952,094 
  Unit for Development Policy (KEO-40) 101,350,000 122,951 0 101,472,951 
  Unit for Development Financing Institutions (KEO-50) 148,725,682 28,691,481 4,153,802 181,570,965 
  Unit for International Environmental Policy (KEO-60)  7,084,000 26,863,679 10,960,499 44,908,178 
  Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (KEO-70) 7,000,000 0 0 7,000,000 
  DEPARTMENT FOR EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 610,000 2,171 337 612,508 
  Trade Policy Unit (TUO-10) 610,000 2,171 337 612,508 
  POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 2,500,000 150,000 150,000 2,800,000 
  Unit for Human Rights Policy (POL-40) 2,500,000 150,000 150,000 2,800,000 
  FREE (UNDIVIDED) 1,298,831 27,116 4,743 1,330,690 
  
                                                 
225 HEL7W0060-1, translation and minor modifications by the author. 
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24.30.66.2 Country-specific and regional development cooperation 231,435,000 121,796,108 74,207,729 427,438,837 
24.30.66.2.1 Country-specific and regional development cooperation 218,235,000 108,836,108 61,447,729 388,518,837 
  DEPARTMENT FOR AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND ITS MISSIONS SUM 136,600,000 54,876,368 35,850,771 227,327,139 
  DEPARTMENT FOR AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST SUM 131,260,000 49,908,739 33,144,812 214,313,551 
  ALI-10 AND ITS MISSIONS SUM 20,000,000 5,260,792 6,167,389 31,428,181 
  Unit for the Middle East and Africa (ALI-10) 19,060,000 4,449,868 5,715,963 29,225,831 
  MISSIONS OF ALI-10 940,000 810,925 451,426 2,202,350 
  Damascus  85,000 0 220,000 305,000 
  Cairo (Egypt) 375,000 446,574 62,177 883,751 
  Rabat 100,000 94,350 15,937 210,287 
  Ramallah 230,000 150,000 38,312 418,312 
  Riad 150,000 30,000 0 180,000 
  Tel Aviv 0 70,000 35,000 105,000 
  Tunis 0 20,000 80,000 100,000 
  ALI-20 AND ITS MISSIONS SUM 72,600,000 24,201,830 13,962,816 110,764,646 
  Unit for Eastern and Western Africa (ALI-20) 70,300,000 23,093,755 13,374,515 106,768,270 
  MISSIONS OF ALI-20 2,300,000 1,108,075 588,301 3,996,376 
  Addis Abeba 300,000 250,000 177,119 727,119 
  Dar es Salaam 600,000 306,981 70,306 977,287 
  Cairo (Sudan) 300,000 0 265,060 565,060 
  Nairobi 1,100,000 551,094 75,816 1,726,910 
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  ALI-30 AND ITS MISSIONS SUM 44,000,000 25,413,745 15,720,566 85,134,312 
 Unit for Southern Africa (ALI-30) 41,900,000 22,365,116 14,054,334 78,319,450 
  MISSIONS OF ALI-30 2,100,000 3,048,629 1,666,232 6,814,861 
  Lusaka 1,100,000 1,765,431 628,321 3,493,752 
  Pretoria 0 500,000 771,017 1,271,017 
  Windhoek 1,000,000 783,198 266,894 2,050,092 
  DEPARTMENT FOR THE AMERICAS AND ASIA AND ITS MISSIONS SUM 69,435,000 40,536,753 23,039,926 133,011,679 
  DEPARTMENT FOR THE AMERICAS AND ASIA SUM 67,640,000 39,113,521 22,319,287 129,072,808 
  ASA-10 AND ITS MISSIONS SUM 15,849,657 16,070,831 15,497,576 47,418,065 
  Unit for Eastern Asia and Oceania (ASA-10) 15,109,657 15,699,334 15,199,625 46,008,616 
  MISSIONS OF ASA-10 740,000 371,498 297,951 1,409,448 
  Bangkok  30,000 86,174 56,986 173,160 
  Hanoi 350,000 256,921 240,965 847,886 
  Jakarta 300,000 28,403 0 328,403 
  Beijing 60,000 0 0 60,000 
  ASA-30 AND ITS MISSIONS SUM 7,320,000 8,202,747 4,031,052 19,553,800 
  Unit for Latin America and Caribbean (ASA-30) 6,855,000 7,742,332 3,917,055 18,514,387 
  MISSIONS OF ASA 30 465,000 460,415 113,998 1,039,413 
  Brazil 100,000 55,000 19,918 174,918 
  Buenos Aires 105,000 51,555 41,335 197,890 
  Lima 0 216,432 16,827 233,259 
  Mexico 200,000 120,000 32,128 352,128 
  Santiago de Chile 60,000 17,428 3,790 81,218 
  
73 
 
  ASA-40 AND ITS MISSIONS SUM 46,265,343 16,263,174 3,511,297 66,039,815 
  Unit for South Asia (ASA-40) 45,675,343 15,671,855 3,202,607 64,549,805 
  MISSIONS OF ASA-40 590,000 591,319 308,690 1,490,010 
  Kabul 470,000 253,815 96,049 819,865 
  Kathmandu 0 170,000 173,936 343,936 
  Yangon 120,000 0 0 120,000 
  Roving Ambassador for South Asia (ASA-11) 0 167,504 38,705 206,209 
  DEPARTMENT FOR EUROPE AND ITS MISSIONS SUM 1,500,000 2,504,574 74,284 4,078,858 
  DEPARTMENT FOR EUROPE 1,200,000 2,421,985 731 3,622,716 
  Unit for EU Enlargement and Western Balkans (EUR-40) 1,200,000 2,421,985 731 3,622,716 
  MISSIONS OF DEPARTMENT FOR EUROPE 300,000 82,589 73,553 456,142 
  Ankara 0 0 101 101 
  Belgrade 0 0 64,029 64,029 
  Pristina 300,000 82,589 9,423 392,012 
  DEPARTMENT FOR RUSSIA, EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA AND ITS 
MISSIONS SUM 
10,700,000 6,202,313 2,472,862 19,375,175 
  DEPARTMENT FOR RUSSIA, EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 10,025,000 5,842,008 2,324,308 18,191,316 
 Unit for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ITÄ-20) 9,525,000 5,823,442 2,324,308 17,672,751 
  Vienna / OSCE 500,000 18,566 0 518,566 
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  MISSIONS OF DEPARTMENT FOR RUSSIA, EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL 
ASIA 
675,000 360,305 148,554 1,183,859 
  Astana 150,000 66,000 15,786 231,786 
  Bucharest 100,000 47,448 39,084 186,532 
  Roving Ambassador for South Caucasus (ITÄ-22) 150,000 45,103 13,767 208,870 
  Roving Ambassador for Central Asia (ITÄ-21) 100,000 93,754 4,590 198,344 
  Kiev 175,000 58,000 36,514 269,514 
  Vilnius 0 50,000 38,813 88,813 
 FREE (UNDIVIDED) 0 4,716,100 9,886 4,725,986 
24.30.66.2.2 Joint project expenditure with the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID)  
12,300,000 11,500,000 11,900,000 35,700,000 
  DEPARTMENT FOR AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 12,300,000 11,500,000 11,900,000 35,700,000 
  Unit for Southern Africa (ALI-30) 12,300,000 11,500,000 11,900,000 35,700,000 
24.30.66.2.4 Joint project expenditure with the Austrian Development Agency (ADA)  500,000 1,000,000 0 1,500,000 
  DEPARTMENT FOR AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 500,000 1,000,000 0 1,500,000 
  Unit for Southern Africa (ALI-30) 500,000 1,000,000 0 1,500,000 
24.30.66.2.7 Joint project expenditure with Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 400,000 460,000 810,000 1,670,000 
  DEPARTMENT FOR AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 400,000 460,000 460,000 1,320,000 
  Unit for Eastern and Western Africa (ALI-20) 400,000 460,000 460,000 1,320,000 
  DEPARTMENT FOR THE AMERICAS AND ASIA 0 0 350,000 350,000 
  Unit for Latin America and Caribbean (ASA-30)     350,000 350,000 
24.30.66.2.8 Joint project expenditure with Germany’s Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
0 0 50,000 50,000 
  DEPARTMENT FOR THE AMERICAS AND ASIA 0 0 50,000 50,000 
  Unit for Latin America and Caribbean (ASA-30) 0 0 50,000 50,000 
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24.30.66.3 European Development Fund 25,157,587 27,761,844 0 52,919,431 
  DEPARTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 25,157,587 27,761,844 0 52,919,431 
  Unit for Development Policy (KEO-10) 25,157,587 27,761,844 0 52,919,431 
24.30.66.4 Non-country specific development cooperation 56,499,900 23,360,191 7,705,386 87,565,477 
  DEPARTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 37,015,000 17,290,432 3,242,460 57,547,892 
  Unit for Development Policy (KEO-10) 5,920,000 4,697,032 160,123 10,777,155 
  Unit for Sectoral Policy (KEO-20) 1,000,000 2,636,693 1,253,615 4,890,308 
 Unit for Civil Society (KEO-30) 0 500,000 0 500,000 
  Unit for UN Development Issues (KEO-40) 9,610,000 262,963 0 9,872,963 
 Unit for Development Financing Institutions (KEO-50) 4,000,000 4,000,000 1,708,806 9,708,806 
  Unit for International Environmental Policy (KEO-60) 10,485,000 3,342,614 114,920 13,942,534 
  Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (KEO-70) 6,000,000 1,851,130 4,997 7,856,127 
  DEPARTMENT FOR EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 8,470,000 4,560,000 3,294,000 16,324,000 
  Trade Unit (TUO-10) 7,900,000 4,045,000 2,779,000 14,724,000 
  Market Access Unit (TUO-20) 570,000 515,000 515,000 1,600,000 
  LEGAL SERVICE 350,000 150,000 0 500,000 
  Unit for Public International Law (OIK-10) 350,000 150,000 0 500,000 
  POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 10,464,900 558,759 545,728 11,569,387 
  Unit for Arms Control (POL-20) 2,160,000 134,914 362,199 2,657,114 
  Unit for Human Rights Policy (POL-40) 3,900,000 2,845 74,944 3,977,789 
  Unit for UN and General Global Affairs (POL-50) 4,404,900 421,000 108,585 4,934,485 
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  DEPARTMENT FOR COMMUNICATIONS 200,000 400,000 200,000 800,000 
  Unit for Development Communications (VIE-30) 200,000 400,000 200,000 800,000 
 FREE (UNDIVIDED) 0 401,000 423,198 824,198 
24.30.66.5 Humanitarian assistance   74,800,000 8,027,103 0 82,827,103 
  DEPARTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 74,800,000 8,027,103 0 82,827,103 
  Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (KEO-70) 74,800,000 8,027,103 0 82,827,103 
24.30.66.6 Planning, support functions and communication of development 
cooperation 
7,961,000 5,129,745 2,953,255 16,044,000 
  ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 55,000 110,000 20,558 185,558 
  Information Services Unit (HAL-41) 55,000 110,000 20,558 185,558 
  DEPARTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 5,976,000 4,036,437 2,362,340 12,374,777 
  Unit for Development Policy (KEO-10) 4,035,000 1,614,769 1,270,595 6,920,363 
  Unit for Sectoral Policy (KEO-20) 1,331,000 1,599,764 344,758 3,275,522 
  Unit or UN Development Issues (KEO-40) 50,000 60,000 154,844 264,844 
  Unit for Development Financing Institutions (KEO-50) 60,000 60,000 60,000 180,000 
  Unit for International Environmental Policy (KEO-60) 50,000 30,588 356 80,944 
  Unit for Administrative and Legal Development Cooperation Matters  (KEO-
80) 
450,000 671,316 531,788 1,653,104 
  DEPARTMENT FOR EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 30,000 40,000 20,596 90,596 
  Trade Unit (TUO-10) 30,000 40,000 20,596 90,596 
  DEPARTMENT FOR COMMUNICATIONS 1,700,000 943,308 208,861 2,852,169 
  Unit for Development Communications (VIE-30) 1,400,000 912,438 204,061 2,516,499 
  Unit for Communications on Asia, Africa and the Americas (VIE-40) 300,000 30,870 4,800 335,670 
  FREE (UNDIVIDED) 200,000   340,900 540,900 
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24.30.66.7 Evaluation and internal audit of development cooperation 2,700,000 2,181,046 771,425 5,652,471 
  LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTRY 2,000,000 1,844,541 771,425 4,615,966 
  Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11) 2,000,000 1,844,541 771,425 4,615,966 
  UNIT FOR INTERNAL AUDIT 700,000 336,505 0 1,036,505 
  Unit for Internal Audit (STY-00) 700,000 336,505 0 1,036,505 
24.30.66.8 Support to development cooperation conducted by civil society 
organizations 
114,000,000 16,361,182 3,595,073 133,956,255 
  DEPARTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 114,000,000 16,361,182 3,595,073 133,956,255 
  Unit for Civil Society (KEO-30) 114,000,000 16,361,182 3,595,073 133,956,255 
  FREE (UNDIVIDED) 0 0 0 0 
24.30.66.9 Concessional credits 16,500,000 15,435,099 10,086,886 42,021,984 
  DEPARTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 16,500,000 15,435,099 10,086,886 42,021,984 
  Department for Development Policy (KEO-50) 16,500,000 15,435,099 10,086,886 42,021,984 
     
 
 
